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INTRODUCTION 
 
The prime objective of scholars of International Relations is to find 
consistent answers to the question of order in the realm of relations among multiple 
actors in the world’s political and economic system. In other words, academics of this 
field attempt to develop theories, models, and hypotheses that can best describe and 
explain past, present, and future patterns of international relations. In this sense, this 
thesis will not be different from any other analytical research with respect to its 
traditional main purpose.  
However, it will probably differ with regard to its general interdisciplinary 
approach that is best exemplified by the theoretical framework and methodology chosen 
to achieve its goal and support its key argument. In fact, underlying the thesis is the 
conscious decision to combine the discipline of International Relations with International 
Political Economy, as it is maintained that there is a reciprocal interdependence 
relationship between the political and economic dimensions of matters. It is asserted that 
in some cases political views, while in some other instances economic reasoning 
influence choices of actors at the international level. However, given the rise of economic 
and financial Globalization it is assumed that the economic aspect within issues has 
gained increasing importance for an accurate analysis of world politics. As associate 
professor at the American University in Cairo, Dr. Ibrahim El Nur affirms that such an 
approach can be extremely insightful, as it allows drawing a clear connection line 
between international relations and the economic dimension that lies underneath them 
and often represents the prime cause of actions by actors in the international system. 
Furthermore, El Nur claims that this combination of disciplines and theories is worth 
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exploring, as issues from diverse realms are becoming progressively more interconnected 
in the globalized era (El Nur, 2007 interview).  
Since the end of the Second World War there has been a nearly universal 
trend toward regionalism, best represented by the European and Southeast Asian cases, 
and the rise of more than one hundred other regional agreements. This tendency, 
however, has experienced a particularly steep increase since the 1980s due to significant 
political and economic developments. The rise of economic and more importantly 
financial globalization fostered by impressive technological progress is regarded as one 
of the key factors correlated to this new wave of regionalism. Such advancements have 
utterly changed the whole realm of international relations and raised a number of 
questions regarding governance, negative effects of increased financial instability and 
possible responses by states to such deep and fast changes (Gilpin, 2000 pp. 40-41). 
Financial instability and governance as the area of study in International 
Relations represent the general topic of the thesis. The first concept is a possible 
consequence of an uncontrolled, precipitate and rushed process of globalization. At the 
same time, the second refers to the challenge posed by the former with regard to the 
problem of how to deal with it effectively in order to reduce the risks of financial 
instability that threaten the economic and thus political and social stability of a country or 
region. In this context, the former president of the World Bank, James, D. Wolfensohn, 
made the following public statement in August 1999:  
This report (World Development Report 1999/2000) seeks neither to praise 
nor to condemn globalization and localization. Rather it recognizes them as 
forces that bring new opportunities, but also raise new or greater challenges 
in terms of economic and political stability” (Wolfensohn 1999 cited in Kim, 
2000 p. 1).  
 
By the same token, Joseph Stiglitz, 2001 Nobel Laureate in economics, asserts in an 
internet-based interview that the high number and frequency of financial crises occurred 
in the last twenty years are to be observed from a broader perspective. They indicate that 
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such financial problems are not isolated; on the contrary, these can be thought of as part 
of an unstable systemic architecture (Stiglitz, 2007 interview).  
More specifically, an analysis of how financial crises may be correlated to 
the distribution of power among the main actors and their attitude toward regional 
integration will be conducted. In this context, regionalism in terms of trade unions and, at 
a higher level, monetary unions will be examined as linked to the question of governance 
of financial instability by the means of the case study of the European Union, i.e. EU, 
and the Association of South East Asian Nations, i.e. ASEAN. Moreover, attention will 
be dedicated to the evaluation of future developments regarding the collocation and 
influence of these regional organizations in the international system and the general trend 
towards deeper regional economic integration. In this context, special consideration will 
be given to the analysis of the possible impact of an eventual financial crisis of the 
United States of America on the power relations among the various players in the 
international arena with particular regard to regional organizations. 
The work will be divided into two main parts: the first part will entail two 
different sections represented by a detailed explanation of the research puzzle and its 
components, as well as a literature review concerning the key issues of financial 
instability, power, and rise of regionalism. The second part of the thesis will contain two 
sections: the separate case studies of the EU and ASEAN. The analysis will then be 
brought to an end with a conclusion that will synthesize and evaluate the critical findings 
of the thesis in relation to the research question. This last assessment is to be viewed as 
crucial, as it will allow gathering all the single pieces of the research puzzle together by 
connecting the key dots among the theoretical framework, the purpose of the analysis and 
the empirical results. 
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CHAPTER I 
RESEARCH QUESTION, METHODOLOGY, 
AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In the following first chapter of the thesis, the research question will be 
presented in order to draw the focus of the reader to the key structural issues of the 
analysis. In a further step, the main argument will be illustrated. Subsequently, the 
methodology used to verify the main hypothesis will be discussed briefly. Finally the 
theoretical framework utilized to conceptualize the research question will be introduced 
and more closely examined in order to show its components in a clear and unmistakable 
manner. 
 
 
Research Question and Objectives 
 
 The research question of the thesis deals with the general environment of 
financial instability and looks at regionalism as a phenomenon that serves to avert the 
risks deriving from it. The title reveals the key correlational relationship that constitutes 
the object of study within the thesis: financial instability as an important element related 
to the prevalence of regionalism.  
The question that the thesis intends to discuss is as follows: is economic 
regionalism to be considered the answer to the risks of financial instability? Is financial 
instability closely linked to the fact that economically more vulnerable countries seek 
mechanisms to protect their economic power and build a shield in the form of regional 
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economic and monetary integration in order to avert the risks of globalization that 
eventually favor strong economies and so attempt a systemic change? 
Answering these questions is important for different reasons: firstly, it will 
allow for a better understanding of how economic and financial globalization has 
changed the realm and dynamics of international relations; secondly, it will be possible to 
explain the mechanisms of international political change from the point of view of 
economic interests; thirdly, it will be feasible to observe the changing economic structure 
of the international system from a strategic perspective and comprehend how economic 
power lies at the heart of the globalized international system; finally, the analysis will 
facilitate evaluating historical events and making assumptions regarding future 
developments that will significantly shape future international relations. 
 
 
Main Hypothesis 
 
The main argument refers to the fact that financial instability is related to the 
fact that economically vulnerable countries seek mechanisms to protect their economic 
power and build a shield in the form of regional economic and monetary integration in 
order to avert the risks of globalization that eventually favor strong economies and 
attempt a change in the international system. At the same time, it is argued that more 
powerful states will endeavor to undermine such efforts made by weaker states at 
fostering regional integration in order to prevent their relative political and economic 
power in that specific region from being diminished. It is clearly identifiable that the 
mode of interaction at the level of the world’s political system and the way change takes 
place within this realm derive from a realist perspective.  
This hypothesis has deep implications for the process of formation of 
economic and political international relations and is thus crucial for understanding 
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international political change and future developments in the structure of the international 
system. On the other hand and away from such a broad perspective, it is also maintained 
that the phenomenon of regional integration analyzed in and for itself occurs as states 
from the same geographic region have a relation of high mutual dependence that makes it 
beneficial for them to participate in regional cooperation and coordination of policies.  
Nevertheless, the main conclusion of the thesis remains drawn from the 
observation of international political change at the higher level of interaction among 
actors in the global political and economic system, thus not considering regional events 
merely on the basis of their regional context. On the contrary, regional developments 
need to be integrated into the broader international system in order to conceptualize their 
potential impact on international relations, and specifically on those reciprocal relations 
among powerful states and more vulnerable states that have formed regional 
organizations. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
How to proceed in order to effectively deal with the research question and the 
purpose of the study represents a crucial part of the analysis and needs to be accurately 
defined and specified. Considering the high degree of complexity of the issues that 
constitute the research puzzle, it is important to support and strengthen the main 
argument of the thesis by the means of a wide range of sources. By doing so, the 
reliability of the findings will be increased and credibility will be granted to the 
conclusion of the thesis. 
First of all, the analysis will start with a historical review of the growing 
relevance and reach of regionalism since the end of the Second World War, while 
dedicating particular attention to the strong momentum that regionalism gained shortly 
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before and in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union. In this realm, the difference 
between the first and the second wave or regionalism will be more closely explained. It 
will also be essential to stress the continuously growing importance of economic power 
over the last sixty years in defining interactions among actors and thus shaping the 
functional mechanisms of the international system. In fact, it will be shown that critical 
political, socio-economic and technological events have led to a redefinition of the 
concept of power different and more complex than it has usually been explicated in 
realist terms.  
Subsequently and not necessarily adopting a comparative approach, official 
documents of regional agreements and treaties signed by members of regional 
organizations such as the EU and ASEAN will be studied with respect to their declared 
objectives. After that, the focus will be shifted toward an evaluation of the increasing 
breadth and depth of policy coordination and the required institutional arrangements. 
This will certainly be helpful in realizing the scope and depth of regionalism as a geo-
political phenomenon. 
Furthermore, attention will be paid to the observation of macro-economic 
indicators such as trade flows, foreign direct investment flows and others demonstrating 
the increasing economic interdependence within regions. Different time frames will be 
used for studying such incremental characteristic of regional interdependence. Graphs 
and data will be made available in order to facilitate the understanding of the meaning of 
such economic indicators. 
In addition to these materials, interviews have been arranged with 
representatives from the political and economic departments of regional organizations 
such as the EU Commission and various diplomatic missions of EU and ASEAN 
member countries including Slovenia and Indonesia in order to receive first-hand 
information about past events and future prospects of development and deepening of 
regional organizations for a better understanding of their objectives. The valuable insight 
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gained in such meetings will be critical for a clearer comprehension of the mode of 
interactions among actors in the global system. In this sense, it will be possible to receive 
direct information about the process of regional integration and the modus operandi of 
regional organizations within the world’s political and economic system. Special 
attention will be given to the relations between such regional bodies and bigger regional 
players; e.g. in the case of Southeast Asian ASEAN’s interactions with regional powers 
such as China, Japan, and the US will be further examined with regard to the main 
argument of the thesis. 
For instance, a visit to the Embassy of Slovenia was organized, in which a 
particularly insightful talk was held with the Counselor and Deputy Head of Mission, 
Sonja Cujovic, who has made a valuable contribution to the analysis thanks to her 
important experience within Europe and in Southeast Asia as well. Moreover, a meeting 
with the Heads of the Political and Trade Departments of the Delegation of the EU 
Commission to Egypt took place, in which essential issues were discussed. Also, a series 
of two different talk sessions with the Third Secretary of the Embassy of Indonesia, 
Danang Waskito, have allowed for a deeper and closer discussion about critical regional 
issues, such as ASEAN’s role, its internal and external relationships, as well as national 
and regional responses to the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Direct consultations with 
diplomatic staff are considered as significant, as they enable the scientific investigation to 
reach beyond the mere evaluation of documents and data and make it possible for 
scholars to observe regionalism from a different, more practical perspective.  
Finally and in addition to the sources mentioned above, it has been regarded 
as equally relevant to include the opinion of experts from the academia, who definitely 
possess the ability to complement the insight delivered by diplomatic staff given their 
broad knowledge as well as independent and autonomous thinking. For this purpose, Dr 
Jill Edwards from the History Department and Dr Ibrahim El Nur from the Political 
Science Department at The American University in Cairo have been interviewed. 
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For practical and transparency reasons, here follows a detailed list comprised 
of all the scholars and diplomatic staff who have been involved in the analytical research 
and evaluation of facts and data: 
- Mr. Michael Ryan, Counselor, Political Affairs, Delegation of the European 
Commission to Egypt; 
- Mrs. Barbara Stacher, First Secretary, Trade Affairs, Delegation of the 
European Commission to Egypt; 
- Mr. Thomas Viot, Expert, Trade and Economic Section, Delegation of the 
European Commission to Egypt; 
- Mrs. Sonja Cujovic, Counselor and Deputy Head of Mission of the 
Embassy of Slovenia; 
- Mr. Danang Waskito, Third Secretary of the Embassy of Indonesia, 
Information Section; 
- Dr. Jill Edwards, Professor in the History Department and Director of the 
European Studies Program at The American University in Cairo; 
- Dr. Ibrahim El Nur, Professor in the Political Science Department at The 
American University in Cairo; 
 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
The conceptual framework of the thesis will include two dimensions 
integrated with each other: Gilpin’s theory of international political change at a macro or 
global level and Keohane’s and Nye’s theory of interdependence at sub-macro or 
regional level. In other words, the theoretical basis for the thesis will be characterized by 
two layers that are connected with each other reflecting an integration of liberalist into 
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realist thought in order to form one single framework. In the following paragraphs 
sufficient explanations will be provided 
Starting from the macro level, the underlying conceptual framework will be 
drawn from a political and economic perspective on change in world politics. Gilpin’s 
theory of international political change offers a useful tool for comprehending the nature 
and dynamics of change (Gilpin, in Viotti and Kauppi 1999 pp. 145-152). However, 
within this research thesis the focus will be shifted more toward aspects that are 
secondary in his original model. The importance of the tendency of smaller and less 
powerful states toward regionalism for counterbalancing the more powerful states or 
hegemons will be highlighted, while the validity of the core assumptions of Gilpin’s 
theory are still maintained. Indeed, international relations continue to be characterized by 
a continuing struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of 
anarchy. On the other hand, the shape of such struggle has been changing over time due 
to political, economic, technological and other developments that have brought about 
change in the international system. This change implies a redistribution of power that 
causes actions and reactions from both powerful and less powerful states to modify the 
equilibrium of the system in their favor and so advance their own interests. In the face of 
the consciousness of less powerful states of the fact that no significant change can be 
achieved by each one individually, their drive towards regionalism is seen as a 
mechanism for changing the system for their own benefit and as a counterbalance 
measure against more powerful states. 
In sum, not a complete reversal of Gilpin’s model, but only an adaptation of 
it will be adopted, which serves the purpose of the thesis of explaining regionalism as a 
phenomenon correlated to financial instability that can be conceived as a linked trend by 
weaker states toward changing power relations in the international system in their favor. 
Thus, a relationship between regionalism and international political change is 
established. At the same time, however, as will be illustrated, more powerful states will 
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still seek to shape the international systems and the relations among actors according to 
realist principles and decision-making process. 
As a complementary part of the theoretical framework used for this thesis and 
in order to understand the significance of regionalism in the dynamics of Gilpin’s theory 
of international political change at the macro level, Keohane’s and Nye’s theory of 
complex interdependence at the sub-macro or regional level will be integrated into the 
basic theoretical framework of the thesis. At the sub-macro or regional level, 
interdependence, as defined by both authors as referring to situations characterized by 
reciprocal effects among countries resulting from international transactions of various 
kinds (the focus will be directed toward states, although other actors are acknowledged), 
is considered as the main feature of international relations among member states of 
regional organizations. Countries within a specific region are assumed to have a relation 
of high mutual dependence that makes it beneficial for them to participate in regional 
coordination of policies. Such interdependence makes the rise and promotion of common 
interests possible, although not necessary (Keohane and Nye, in Viotti and Kauppi 1999 
pp. 307-317).  
For this thesis, the first characteristic of the concept of complex 
interdependence that deals with multiple channels connecting societies is regarded as less 
important, since the focus is shifted toward the state as the main actor. On the contrary, 
particular attention will be given to the second and third characteristics of 
interdependence: the former refers to the idea that the agenda of interstate relationships 
consists of multiple issues not organized along hierarchical lines that need policy 
coordination in the face of high opportunity costs. The latter feature deals with the 
assumption that military force is not used by governments toward other governments 
within the same region in a situation of stable and durable complex interdependence 
(Keohane and Nye, in Viotti and Kauppi 1999 pp. 311-312). In this context, the authors 
  13 
argue that the potential role of international institutions in political bargaining is highly 
increased (Keohane and Nye, in Viotti and Kauppi 1999 p. 316). 
Keohane’s and Nye’s opinion that both Realism and their theory of 
interdependence represent ideal types and that most reality-based situations will fall 
somewhere between these two extremes is representative for this research work. Such 
stance on these theories of international relations allows integrating them into one single 
model that combines key aspects of both.  
In sum, Keohane’s interdependence theory will be used in order to prove that 
cooperation among states is possible at a sub-macro or regional level in the presence of 
mutual dependence and interests within a certain confined region. Then, this Liberalist 
approach will be integrated into a broader realist perspective at the macro level that will 
allow explaining how cooperation within a region or regionalism can be regarded as a 
realist mechanism for advancing the members’ own interests against other regional or 
global hegemons. Indeed, it is maintained that weaker states seek regional integration in 
order to increase their leverage against major powers. By doing this, they provide 
protection of their economies in the face of financial instability and the deriving high 
probability of financial crises that would affect them more severely than powerful 
countries, which would benefit in relative terms from a realist perspective. 
 
 
Limitations of Theories 
 
In this section of the thesis the focus will be directed toward the discussion 
over the limitations of both theories that form the conceptual framework underlying the 
analysis. This will make it possible to reach a more complete understanding of the 
reasons for the chosen integration of two distinct theories and so for the double-layered 
structure of the theoretical framework. This concise examination will be organized into 
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three different subsections: the first two will encompass a critique of each separate theory 
with respect to the research question, while the last subsection will present the reasons 
for an integration of both theories and reinforce the view that these may represent 
complementary parts of a single theory. 
 
 
Gilpin’s Model of International Political Change 
 
Although Gilpin’s model entails some differences from the early realist 
writings of Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes, it certainly maintains a vast part of its 
essential characteristics. Firstly, the author’s starting point is represented by the typical 
realist postulation of a state of anarchy in the international system. In this sense, 
international relations are understood as a recurring struggle for wealth and power among 
independent actors, in which there are no binding rules or generally accepted laws with 
the necessary sanctions mechanisms that could force actors to abide by them. This 
assumption clearly derives from Hobbes’ state of nature of the human being and is 
extrapolated to the level of international relations among states. In this context, realists 
do not refer to anarchy as an image of violence, destruction, or chaos. On the contrary, 
they tend to focus merely on the absence of any authority above states, which are seen as 
sovereign and independent actors. For such reasons, it is possible to assert that anarchy is 
the defining characteristic of the environment, within which states interact with other 
each other, thus shaping international relations (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999 p. 68).  
The other typical realist feature of the international system is represented by 
the uneven distribution of power among states (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999 p. 71). Most 
modern realists describe power as the sum of military, economic, technological, 
diplomatic, and other capabilities at the disposal of the state in relation to the capabilities 
of other states (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999 p. 64). Therefore, it seems obvious that despite 
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the absence of authority there is a hierarchy of power in international politics (Viotti and 
Kauppi, 1999 p. 68). 
Hence, according to the characteristics of the international system proposed 
by realist theory, alliances and coalitions may have a merely temporary character and are 
not long-term oriented. They are transitory phenomena that help sustain the stability of 
the international system by creating a bipolar or multipolar balance of power among 
opposite sides. This surely constitutes a serious practical limitation, when it comes to 
analyzing the empirical data, since it cannot be accounted for stable, solid, and long-term 
oriented multilateral and regional agreements such as the EU or ASEAN. In other words, 
the premises of a state of anarchy combined with an uneven distribution of power among 
states make the realist theory too deterministic. It is assumed that there are objective 
conditions that cannot be altered or influenced by policymakers (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999 
pp. 73, 83-84). 
Secondly, it appears clear that the state is regarded as the only relevant actor 
in the international system, which follows the realist state-centered view of international 
relations (Gilpin, in Viotti and Kauppi, 1999 p. 148). However, this is not entirely 
representative of the empirical reality, as it can be stated that non-state actors, such as 
influential multinational or other non-governmental organizations that operate in a cross-
national environment do play a key role in the process of policy making. Consequently, 
this fact has a critical impact on the decision-making process of the executive body of a 
country (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999 pp. 84-85). From the point of view of the thesis, states 
are still regarded as the main players in the international system. Nevertheless, the 
importance of other non-state actors is also acknowledged, although this is definitely not 
the focus point of the analysis. 
Thirdly, Gilpin’s model shares with Realism the fact that it is mainly 
concerned with military security and it considers war as the primary mechanism for 
settling disputes at the international level. In this respect, peace is only seen as a period 
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of truce between wars (Gilpin, in Viotti and Kauppi, 1999 p. 148). It is also for this 
reason that cooperation in terms of alliances among different states is treated as an 
instrumental part of the stability theory of balance of power and does not make any real 
difference to the state of anarchy of the international environment. Of course, this cannot 
explain a number of real situations, in which war has not been the prime means for 
resolving a crisis. On the contrary, the role of peaceful negotiation and conflict resolution 
needs to be acknowledged. Furthermore, even economic interdependence is conceived in 
terms of security and distribution of power. According to realist thought, this should thus 
be minimized, as it could compromise the capabilities of an individual state in relation to 
another by allowing the latter to have some leverage over the former (Viotti and Kauppi, 
1999 p. 77). This specific feature shows the limited usefulness and shortsightedness of 
realist theory, since it does not recognize the consequent reciprocity of interdependence, 
which allows for a mutual deterrence from hurting the other’s interests by giving 
leverage to both sides. 
Hence, the model does not fully acknowledge other important issues, such as 
economy or society. Indeed, realists have usually tended to view the economy as 
subordinate to political choice. Thus, the issues of national and international security are 
defined as the object of high politics and are regarded as more important than economy, 
trade, finance and other socioeconomic and humanitarian matters, which form the object 
of low politics (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999 p. 77). From the perspective of the thesis, 
nevertheless, the economic dimension of power is considered more critical to 
international relations given the high level of interdependence created by the process of 
economic and financial globalization as well as the need for sound economic 
performance in order to finance foreign policy. Therefore, it can be asserted that in many 
cases economy dominates or at least influences political choice to a great extent, and not 
only vice-versa as sustained by realist theory. In this regard, one could also speak of the 
increasing relevance of geo-economics compared to geo-politics. 
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Another crucial limitation that is worth examining refers to the question of 
rationality. Gilpin, according to the realist tradition, assumes that states are rational 
actors, and their decisions and actions are based on sound rational reasoning. It goes 
without saying that this point is also connected to the issues of defining national interests 
and the view of the state as a unitary actor. The author takes a very clear stance on this 
matter, as he claims that states will seek to bring about change in the international 
political and economic system by the means of territorial, political, and economic 
expansion, if the expected benefits of action exceed its expected costs. The effect would 
be a modified distribution of power among actors in the global system (Gilpin, in Viotti 
and Kauppi, 1999 pp. 149-152). However, there are a number of difficulties with such 
approach to states behavior. In fact, the main flaw in Gilpin’s model lies in the 
oversimplifying rationality assumption. This is problematic, as it presumes the 
availability of perfect information as well as the ability to process and analyze huge 
amounts of data and facts. These conditions are almost never given in reality. In addition, 
this premise leads to an underestimation of subjective and situational variables, such as 
human behavior, that is not necessarily rational. As a consequence, the objectives of 
states, the definition of their national interests and actions retain a certain level of 
subjectivity and might also be affected by the complex interplay of various forces within 
the state. 
 Furthermore, Gilpin does not directly address the reasons for states to 
undertake actions aimed at changing the international system in their favor. Regarding 
the presumed state of anarchy of the global environment as the major cause for such 
states behavior can be seen as an oversimplification of reality and disregard of other 
objective and subjective factors that play a role in a specific situation. In this sense, 
Gilpin’s approach based on a cost-and-benefit analysis that underlies the decision-
making process is controversial, because there is no perfect information at the disposal of 
the decision-makers, so that decisions are most probably not only based on objective 
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data, but also on subjective considerations as well as situational factors. Rationality is 
necessarily bounded or limited, and can never be absolute. 
Despite all these limitations of Gilpin’s model, the author has made his most 
valuable contribution to the development of Realism as a theory and in general to the 
study of International Relations by the means of shifting the attention toward the 
dynamics, patterns, and circumstances, under which international political change occurs. 
In this context, it is important to note Gilpin’s recognition of the possibility that political, 
economic, and technological developments may play a significant role in spurring change 
or producing the conditions, under which change takes place. The key limitations with 
regard to his contribution are twofold: firstly Gilpin’s model focuses excessively on 
security and war as the primary vehicle of change, while there have been a number of 
peaceful transitions, negotiations and conflict resolutions that remain unexplained by this 
model. Secondly, the author considers international political change as being attempted 
and eventually achieved merely by stronger states by deploying their higher capabilities 
compared to more vulnerable countries. This perspective has no explanatory validity, 
when individual powerful states have to deal with weaker states grouped in broad and 
cohesive regional organizations that prefer to lead negotiations as one single actor in 
order to maximize their leverage and minimize the influence of their counterpart. This 
represents a crucial point for the theoretical framework of the thesis, as the focus of the 
analysis will be directed toward the behavior of such less influential states and their 
actions represented by regional institutions. At the same time, it is acknowledged that 
bigger regional or global powers will still try to achieve change for their own benefit. In 
order to do this, they might resolve to undermine the drive toward regionalism, as they 
view it as a threat to their regional power. 
In sum, it can be asserted that there are a number of relevant limitations and 
weaknesses in Gilpin’s model of international political change. However, his main 
contribution has been extremely important for the further development of the model itself 
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into a more comprehensive one that is able to gain a considerable higher explanatory 
capability achieved by expanding its reach and dealing with its shortcomings. 
 
 
Keohane’s and Nye’s Model of Complex Interdependence 
 
Liberalism in general and Keohane’s and Nye’s model specifically can be 
considered as the complementary counterpart of Realism. In fact, most of the weaknesses 
of Gilpin’s model and the realist tradition can be identified with the strengths of the 
liberalist approach. From this point of view, the strengths of Realism and Gilpin’s 
framework in particular can be regarded on the whole as the shortcomings of liberalist 
theories. 
Indeed, Liberalism shows little regard for the traditionally realist state-
centered view of international relations. In fact, it needs to be underlined that in the end 
the states are the primary actors in the international system, as they make and implement 
decisions, although they might be influenced to a certain degree by several internal and 
external forces during the policy and decision-making processes. Certainly, it is neither 
feasible to estimate how big such influence is in reality nor to reach an exact 
understanding of how intricate such interplay of factors is. For this reason, Liberalism 
offers a useful theory in realizing the complexity of real situations; however, it does not 
provide an effective practical method for simplifying the extremely high amount of 
information at hand, which is obviously necessary in order to attain a precise and 
accurate analysis of the policy and decision-making process. 
As the analysis of Keohane’s and Nye’s model is taken further and deeper, a 
few more critical flaws need to be more closely examined: firstly, a crucial limitation of 
Keohane’s and Nye’s theory is represented by its inability to explain the still high degree 
of frequency of war as a mechanism to solve international disputes. Especially, as far as 
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regional conflicts are concerned, the model does not deliver any satisfactory answer to 
the question of order, as the concept of complex interdependence is not capable of 
illuminating the reasons and circumstances, under which conflicts are still resolved by 
violent means. 
Secondly, there is an inherent disregard of the state of anarchy in the 
international system. The fact that international regimes, institutions and organizations 
might arise due to a situation of mutual dependence does not necessarily mean that the 
absence of any hierarchy of authority is overcome. 
Thirdly, another important limitation derives from the consideration that 
Keohane’s and Nye’s model does not possess a truly global character, but is rather 
confined within a certain geographical region. This is an essential point for a full 
understanding of the theoretical model developed for the thesis, as it exemplifies the need 
for an integration of both theories into one single conceptual framework. 
Despite such weaknesses, the fundamental contribution that Keohane and 
Nye have made to the study of International Relations is definitely represented by the 
illustration of a world, in which actors might find themselves in a situation of complex 
interdependence. With respect to the research question and main argument of the thesis, 
both political scientists have facilitated the construction of the theoretical framework as a 
synthesis of Realism and Liberalism by pointing out the possibility that international 
organizations will act as arenas for political action by weak states (Keohane and Nye, in 
Viotti and Kauppi 1999 p. 317). This specific advancement provides the grounds for 
sustaining the key hypothesis that more vulnerable states will use regional agreements 
and institutions in order to increase their individual leverage in a context of financial 
instability against strong regional and global powers by bringing their capabilities 
together and acting as one single player. 
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Need for an Integration of Both Theories 
 
How does order come about or is achieved in the international system? This 
is the ever recurring question for scholars, academia and diplomats who deal with 
international relations. Realism and Liberalism, as exemplified in the specific models of 
Gilpin, on one side, and Keohane and Nye on the other, offer two plausible explanations 
of the mechanism that regulates and fosters order in the global system. The very fact that 
both theories of international political change and that of complex interdependence seek 
to find an answer to the same question of order in international relations makes it worth 
exploring ways, in which an integration of models can bring the analysis forward.  
Of course, Liberalism provides a different perspective on international 
relations than Realism. Both theories draw the attention to multiple variables and 
important features. By doing this, they are never antithetical or irreconcilable; on the 
contrary, as has been previously discussed, they should be regarded as complementary 
parts of the same group of theories. For instance, the differences between Realism and 
Marxism are much deeper and more substantial, while Liberalism and Realism do have 
many common characteristics and points of encounter. 
Their integration takes place at the level of the international system analyzed 
from a broad viewpoint, as the key aspects of each model are evaluated in terms of their 
compatibility. At this point, it is worth reminding that a number of modifications and 
adaptations of the original models have been decided and implemented in order to 
respond to their inherent weaknesses and deliver the grounds for a successful 
incorporation into one single framework. It is argued that the crucial difference between 
macro and sub-macro level perspectives represents an essential element that enables the 
construction of a clearly identifiable double-layered conceptual model. From a sub-macro 
point of view, Keohane and Nyes’s concept of complex interdependence facilitates 
understanding the rise and relevance of regional cooperation. At the same time, from a 
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macro standpoint these regional players comprised of weaker states need to be included 
into the wider context of an anarchy-based international system, within which the 
destabilizing forces of financial and economic globalization are more likely to damage 
vulnerable countries than others. According to the realist approach, because they feel 
threatened by more powerful countries and the risks of financial instability, they decide 
to increase the level of integration and use regional organizations as an effective means 
to raise their individual leverage in international relations. Hence, the capability of 
weaker states to seek and achieve international political change is fully acknowledged. 
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CHAPTER II 
FINANCIAL INSTABILITY, POWER, AND REGIONALISM 
 
The second chapter of the thesis will include a review of the main literature 
concerning the three most important areas that form the context, within which the 
analysis of international relations is pursued. As the heading suggests, these consist of 
the issues of financial instability, power, and regionalism. An introduction to the 
following relevant questions is offered, while these will be further explained and 
illustrated in the second part of the thesis by the means of the case studies of the EU and 
ASEAN:  
- What is economic and financial globalization? What are the reasons for 
global financial instability? 
- How is power to be defined in the context of globalization? 
- How can the rise of international regimes and in particular regional 
organizations be explained? What impact has globalization had on 
regionalism? 
 
 
Globalization and Financial Instability 
 
In this section of the second chapter, some of the key aspects of the process 
of globalization will be presented and discussed. Among these there is certainly the 
question of finding a proper definition for this extremely complex concept. Furthermore, 
the role of global capitalism and technological progress will be illustrated also in terms of 
their destabilizing effect on the world’s economic and financial architecture. In order to 
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provide empirical evidence of the instability deriving from globalization, studies and 
charts of a representative sample of relevant financial crises will be provided. 
 
 
The Problem of Definition 
 
Undoubtedly, globalization is one of the most discussed, controversial, and 
confusing concepts of contemporary politics. Three are the main questions that arise: the 
first is concerned with the definition of the notion; the second aims at establishing 
whether globalization constitutes a new or an old phenomenon; the third and last 
investigates the nature of its impact. 
There is no single clear-cut, widely accepted definition of the term, as its 
meaning depends on the perspective, scale, and depth of the analysis. Indeed, there are a 
number of possible explanations that direct the attention to specific aspects worth 
considering. For instance, the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan made the 
following public statement in September 3, 1998:  
Globalization has an immense potential to improve people’s lives, but it can 
disrupt – and destroy – them as well. Those who do not accept its pervasive, 
all-encompassing ways are often left behind. It is our task to prevent this; to 
ensure that globalization leads to progress, prosperity and security for all. I 
intend that the United Nations shall lead this effort (Annan 1998 cited in 
Kim, 2000 p. 1). 
  
From a similar point of view, the British sociologist Anthony Giddens made 
the succeeding comment during a session of the Reith Lecture organized by the BBC 
network in 1999: 
Globalization not only pulls upwards, it pushes downwards, creating new 
pressures for local autonomy. The American sociologist Daniel Bell 
expresses this very well when he says that the nation becomes too small to 
solve the big problems, but also too large to solve the small 
ones…..globalization is becoming increasingly de-centered not under the 
control of any group of nations, and still less of the large corporations. Its 
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effects are felt just as much as in the Western countries as elsewhere 
(Giddens 1999 cited in Kim, 2000 p. 1). 
 
These definitions all point out different central traits of the concept that are 
worth analyzing further: firstly, the global character and reach of globalization, which 
leads to the consequence that there are issues that concern the global sphere and cannot 
be tackled from a narrow locally-oriented angle. In fact, it can be asserted that there is an 
evident, although fuzzy contrast, and discrepancy between the global and local context, 
so that responding or finding answers to new or altered problems has become more 
complex. Secondly, it appears clear that globalization is more than a one-dimensional 
phenomenon. As a matter of fact, it involves many different realms and takes place in all 
key aspects of contemporary international life, not only in the economic, but also in the 
social, cultural, diplomatic, political, security, and environmental domains, albeit at a 
different pace and intensity (Kim, 2000 pp. 10-11). Finally and more significantly, the 
broadly accepted truth is mentioned in the preceding quotes that globalization offers 
great opportunities, but at the same time poses serious threats to the ability of states, non-
state actors, people and communities to act, react and adapt in a deeply changed 
environment. In other words, this phenomenon poses a challenge of governance, i.e. there 
is a need to define clear rules in order to govern newly introduced or altered processes. 
Probably the simplest, however most effective definition of globalization was 
delivered by Jones, who argues that the quantitative characteristics of this phenomenon 
have developed to a point, at which they have generated a qualitative change in world 
affairs: 
The most general qualitative proposition about globalization is that it is 
characterized by time-space compression, in which distant events and 
developments impact upon local conditions with greater immediacy and 
speed than in the past (Jones, 1999 p. 365). 
 
This definition summarizes in a clear-cut manner the new elements added by 
globalization that pose new challenges to the question of governance by states. This 
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represents a principal area of interest for the research question of the thesis, that is how to 
cope with financial instability deriving from the phenomenon of globalization from the 
point of view of the major actors in the international system, i.e. states. 
 
 
Global Capitalism and Instability 
 
The most frequently debated dimension of such broad and complex process is 
definitely represented by the so-called economic globalization, which may be interpreted 
as the cause of financial instability. This has its roots in the spread of global capitalism 
over the last two hundred years and more intensively in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, as will be more closely examined in this subsection. Special attention will be 
given to the latest economic and technological developments that have fostered a new 
level of economic integration, while facilitating instantaneous capital flow and thus 
increasing the probability of financial unbalances and quick speculative trends. This will 
be demonstrated by the means of a few selected cases of financial crisis that occurred in 
the last twenty years, i.e. the US stock market crash of 1987 and the Mexican currency 
crisis of 1994. 
In the last few decades, the growth of international trade has been higher than 
that of world output. However, increased international trade is not only the cause of 
economic globalization as the nurturing of interdependence between economies at a 
global level. Indeed, there are few key developments in technology, finance and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) by multinational corporations (MNCs) that need to be thoroughly 
scrutinized. In this respect, globalization is the result of many different changes and 
advancements. Hence it can be regarded as an aspect of modern capitalism, founded on 
technological progress (Gilpin 2000, p. 18-29). 
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In the second half of the last century, trade barriers have declined 
significantly due to successive rounds of trade negotiations, as it is exemplified by the 
drop from forty to only 6 percent of the average tariff levels of industrialized countries on 
imported goods. The general trend is illustrated in appendix I. In addition, since the late 
1970s a wave of deregulations and privatizations has further opened national economies 
to trade and FDI. At the same time, the invention of new technologies in transportation, 
such as trucks and more importantly air carriers, has drastically reduced transportation 
costs, encouraged trade expansion and investment in other economies. In fact, this has 
facilitated the growth of FDI, which has been even higher than that of international trade. 
Since the 1980s FDI has risen with an astonishing average annual growth rate of 15 
percent. Such significant development, i.e. the expansion of MNCs and the rapid increase 
in FDI, has had a deep impact on the structure of the world economy by integrating 
different national economies more utterly. Hence, economic interdependence on a global 
scale has been strengthened. As a consequence, on the other hand, grave economic or 
financial unbalances created in one region can have impressive spill-over effects to other 
regions, and sometimes even on the global economy as a whole (Gilpin, 2000 pp. 18-21).  
The following figures and tables highlight the outstanding growth of trade 
flows and FDI in absolute terms and in relation to GDP growth. Figure 1 shows the 
stunning expansion of exports during the three decades that followed the end of the 
Second World War. The curve illustrates the fact that the aftermath of that war marked 
the beginning of a new and unprecedented era of international trade, when one takes into 
account that the previous one was highly biased by colonialism and trade flows between 
colonies and colonial powers. At the same time, figure 2 indicates the consequent 
growing importance of trade as a portion of world output between 1950 and 1995. On the 
other hand, tables 1 and 2 emphasize the uneven distribution of inward and outward FDI 
stocks by group of economies, which makes it easy to comprehend the enormous 
disparity between developed and developing countries. It is worth noting that such 
  28 
serious global unbalance has only minimally changed overtime. Indeed, if the first 
group’s share of FDI stock as of 1980 is compared with its more recent value of 2002, it 
can be concluded that no relevant shift has taken place, as this figure dropped by only 1 
percent from 88 to 87 percent of the world FDI stock. Furthermore, figure 3 presents data 
concerning the annual growth of outward FDI stock by region for the same period of time 
between 1980 and 2002. It appears clear from this figure that FDI has grown 
substantially over the past three decades and the level of interconnectedness among 
economies has increased dramatically. Finally, figure 4 is extremely insightful, as it puts 
the growth of world GDP, exports and FDI into relation for the period from 1970 to 
2003. It is clearly discernible that during the 1970s the growth of these figures was equal 
and that exports quickly became more relevant during the 1980s. However, the data show 
that over time, precisely during the 1990s, FDI gained more relevance and weight. In 
fact, its growth has been remarkably higher than that of output or trade. 
 
Figure 1.  Total Merchandise Export Growth 1952-1970, % Change 
 
Source: World Trade Organization 
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Figure 2.  World Trade/Output Growth 1950-1995, % Change 
 
Source: Terborg, 2003 p. 57. 
 
 
Table 1.  Inward FDI Stock, by Group of Economies in Billions of US$ 
 
Source: UNCTAD 
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Table 2.  Outward FDI Stock, by Group of Economies in Billions of US$ 
 
Source: UNCTAD 
 
 
Figure 3.  Annual Growth Rates of Outward FDI Stock, % Change 
 
Source: UNCTAD 
Note: Data for Central and Eastern European are for 1992-1999 and 2000-2002 only. 
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Figure 4.  World Total FDI, Exports, and GDP 
 
Source:  UNCTAD 
 
As a result of this number of developments, FDI has grown faster and more 
substantially than both international trade and world output. As a matter of fact, through 
a comparison between figure 1 and 2 on one side, and table 1 and 2 on the other, it 
appears evident that FDI has become the figure, by which global economic 
interconnectedness is measured. In this context, it is important to take into consideration 
the data contained in appendix II and III regarding the inwards and outward FDI stock 
ranking by country. It seems justified to state that the global economic interdependence 
or globalization is dominated by developed countries that are the biggest investors and 
receivers of investment at the same time. This provides them with a unique power to 
influence the economic course of the rest of the world. In this sense, weak states and 
regions cannot exert a decisive amount of influence on global economic affairs. For this 
reasons, it is possible and reasonable to assert that developing countries and regions, i.e. 
the South, are vulnerable to the power of the developed world, i.e. the North. 
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Furthermore, successive and continuous advancements in communication and 
information technology have caused transaction costs to fall dramatically within a short 
period of time. The broad introduction of the computer and internet has had an 
extraordinary impact on every aspect of social, economic and political life. It appears 
obvious that the use of such devices will have an important impact on the productivity of 
the global economy. The rise of the New Economy does not only refer to software 
companies. On the contrary, from a broader perspective it deals with the implementation 
of these technological advances in all aspects of economic activities. Although it is not 
entirely foreseeable, the information and communication revolution is likely to have a 
much greater impact in the medium-long-term by producing a new wave of modern 
industrial revolution based on computing systems and internet, and create a new 
Kontradieff wave (Gilpin 2000. pp. 29-34). This Russian economist drew the attention in 
the 1920s to the possibility of long economic cycles – roughly fifty years long – in the 
economies of major capitalist countries that arise from clusters of innovations at 
particular times and in particular economic sectors. These clusters create a new leading 
sector of the economy which grows rapidly and drives a general economic upswing, such 
as the Kontradieff waves fostered by the steam and electric power (Goldstein, 1985 pp. 
411-412). 
One of the main effects of such progress has been the formation of a far more 
highly integrated international financial system. Capital has become mobile through the 
use of computer and internet in a way that it can be moved from one part of the world to 
the other within seconds. In addition, since the mid 1970s, the removal of capital controls 
and the creation of new financial instruments have greatly contributed to fostering a 
highly integrated financial system. This can be easily exemplified by the volume of 
foreign exchange trading that reached the astonishing level of around US$ 1.5 trillion per 
day in the 1990s. At the same time, the global volume of exports was US$ 25 billion per 
day (Gilpin, 2000 pp. 21-22). Such figures can directly explain the higher financial 
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integration and linkage between different economies compared to their trade relations. As 
the mobility of capital is often driven by short-term decisions of speculative nature, 
global finance has become a cause of economic instability. For these reasons, the 
possibility of the very same phenomenon of spill-over effects among interconnected 
regions fostered by huge unbalances, which has been identified in the realm of 
international trade and FDI, can be expected to be even more realistic and substantial for 
the domain of financial globalization. It seems obvious to arrive to such conclusion if a 
comparison between the weight of economic and financial globalization as separate 
processes is drawn, i.e. US$ 1.5 trillion per day in financial transactions exceed by far the 
volume of US$ 25 billion per day in trade. This huge difference is illustrated in the 
following figure 5 (Gilpin, 2000 pp. 21-22). 
 
Figure 5.  Foreign Exchange to Exports in US$ Billion per Day 
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Source: Gilpin, 2000 p. 22 
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The prevalence of a highly integrated international financial system is also 
confirmed by the significance of a few other developments. For instance, the amount of 
investment capital seeking higher returns has grown enormously. In fact, by the mid-
1990s, mutual funds, pension funds, and the like totaled US$ 20 trillion. This represents 
ten times the 1980 figure. In addition, the weight of these substantial investments is 
greatly magnified, as a growing part of them is financed with borrowed funds. Finally, 
derivatives and other financial instruments play an important role in international 
finance. Given their total value of approximately US$ 360 trillion, which is even larger 
than the value of the entire global economy, they have massively contributed to the rise 
of financial instability. From the perspective of these facts and statistics, it goes without 
saying that this unstable financial interconnectedness has a profound impact on and a big 
potential for destabilization the global economy (Gilpin, 2000 p. 22). 
 
Figure 6.  Evolution of International Financial Integration, 1983-2001 
 
Source: Lane, 2003 p. 45 
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As can be seen in figure 6, this financial revolution has had the effect of 
linking national economies more closely to one another, increasing the capital available 
to developing countries, and in some cases accelerating economic development. 
However, it is a matter of fact that large portions of these financial flows and capital 
investments are short-term, highly volatile, and speculative. For this reason, international 
finance has become the weakest and most unstable aspect of the global capitalist system. 
In fact, the immense scale, velocity, and speculative nature of financial transactions have 
made governments more vulnerable to sudden changes in these movements. As will be 
presented in the following subsection, there are a number of events, e.g. the crash of 
1987, the European currency crisis of 1992, the Mexican peso collapse of 1994, and the 
devastating East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, which confirm this hypothesis 
and support the argument that individual countries have become more exposed to forces 
that they are not capable of controlling. It will be shown that this problematic condition 
drives governments to seek mechanisms to shield the value of their economy, of which 
regional integration provides the best example (Gilpin, 2000 p. 22). 
 
 
Examples of Financial Instability 
 
At this point, a few cases will be presented and briefly examined, which will 
enable a better understanding of the scale and scope of such highly unstable international 
financial system. The specific financial crises that hit the European Monetary System and 
East Asia during the 1990s will be more closely analyzed in the second part of the thesis 
within the respective chapters concerning European and Southeast Asian regionalism.  
The prevailing global financial instability became increasingly apparent since 
the Black Monday of October 19, 1987, which is to be remembered as the worst day in 
the history of the American stock markets. In fact, within only one single day of 
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transactions, the Dow Jones Index dropped an astonishing 22.6% of its total value. This 
event triggered a serious downward movement on the major stock markets of the world, 
e.g. the London Stock Exchange Index lost 20 percent of its value within one week, the 
German Dax suffered a drop of around 30 percent within one month, and the rest of the 
markets followed the same trend (Benetazzo, 2005 pp. 52-55). As can be seen from the 
following graph, the collapse of the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index was even heavier, 
falling by approximately 45 percent within only one week of transactions.  
 
Figure 7.  S&P 500 Index, 1985-1987 
 
 
Source: Bates, 1991 p. 1010. 
 
The crash of 1987 came unexpectedly. In fact, if the information concerning 
the put and call options is analyzed, it needs to be underlined that the price for put 
options, which serve as a crash insurance, was unusually high during the year preceding 
the crash until the market peaked in August 1987. After that, however, the price for put 
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options went back to normal levels during the two months before the actual collapse 
(Bates, 1990 pp. 1009-1012). This figure clearly indicates that market participants 
expected substantial negative jumps in the market, although there were no strong fears of 
a crash in the two months immediately preceding Black Monday. For this reason, it is 
argued that if the crash was a rational bubble – a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy – this 
burst in August, not on October 19 (Bates, 1990 pp. 1036-1037).  
Prior to this event, an unprecedented worldwide stock market boom had 
taken place lasting for almost four years, from 1983 to 1987. Similarly to the situation in 
1929, such prolonged wave of positive increases in stock prices caused a general sense of 
euphoria among investors. Of course, a few analysts were conscious of the fact that such 
boom was unsound and unsustainable in the long-term, and that at some point an 
adjustment would occur. Thus, in many respects, the crisis of 1987 resembled the crash 
of 1929. A number of events unleashed a chain reaction that finally brought the situation 
out of control. The government bond market in the United States was mainly dependent 
on Japanese buying. Therefore, when Japan started selling these bonds in order to face a 
strong speculative wave in the internal bond and stock market, the downward pressure on 
the US Dollar was enhanced. At the same time, the US administration was apparently 
planning to limit tax deductibility in leveraged buyouts of companies, which caused 
discontent among investors. The last major factor was a dramatic article in the Sunday, 
October 18, issue of the New York Times, in which the Treasury Secretary, James Baker, 
openly advocated for a devaluation of the American currency (Soros, 1988 pp. 65-69). 
This undermined the credibility of the US market dramatically and spread panic among 
market participants, who sought an exit from such unstable circumstances. As a 
consequence, an enormous amount of sell orders was accumulated during the weekend, 
so that the Dow Jones Index was already losing around 10 percent at market opening on 
October 19 (Benetazzo, 2005 pp. 54-55). 
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In this context, it needs to be remembered that this crash occurred in 1987, 
when financial markets were not as developed as they are today.  For example, during the 
1990s hedge funds and the like greatly increased their share of investment. Indeed, these 
speculative firms have come to control more than 10 percent of the American stock 
market, so that they can exert a decisive influence on the overall direction of the market 
as well as on the movement of individual stocks. If for instance the development of the 
price of crude oil is examined, it could be concluded that its increase would reflect the 
actual rise of demand toward a stable supply. In reality, this is only partially true. As is 
known, private investors have recently entered the market of futures, thus increasing the 
speculative pressures on such financial instruments. Nowadays, one only needs an online 
bank account in order to buy and sell commodities such as crude oil, gas and others. This 
fact illustrates the extremely enhanced potential for market distortions by short-term 
oriented, speculative investments. 
A second example of instability is provided by the financial crisis that struck 
the Mexican Peso in 1994. Of course, the specifics of the situation as well as the causes 
of the individual crisis are different from case to case. However, it can be asserted that 
there is a systemic problem underlying this chain of events that have occurred in recent 
times in different regions of the world. In the instance of Mexico, the question that arises 
is whether there were any indicators signaling the build-up to the crisis that occurred at 
the end of 1994. It is argued that this financial crisis was not the result of poor fiscal 
performance by the Mexican government, which is quite different from the nature of the 
previous Mexican crisis of 1982. In fact, during the period of 1990-1994 Mexico’s 
operational budget balance had been in surplus and Mexico’s debt/gross domestic 
product ratio was low, down from 78.4 percent in 1986 to 34.7 percent in 1993. From the 
point of view of some scholars, the Mexican financial crisis was determined by 
unexpected external and internal shocks that were not dealt with by sound and adequate 
actions (Sachs, Tornell, Velasco, Giavazzi and Szeleky, 1996 pp. 16-19).  
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Two important figures were indicating that Mexico was heading toward a 
financial stalemate, although not necessarily a crisis: a currency overvaluation and a large 
and increasing current account deficit. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Mexican Peso 
increased by 20-25 percent relative to the long-term. The latter figure, defined as the 
balance between savings and investments, started deteriorating during the same period of 
time due to a declining national savings rate. Nevertheless, it is argued that these factors 
alone are not capable of explaining a deep financial crisis such as the one that occurred in 
1994 (Sachs, Tornell, Velasco, Giavazzi and Szeleky, 1996 pp. 19-21). Indeed, many 
countries around the world show similar, if not even worse economic conditions, but 
these have not led their economy to any comparable collapse. This came unexpectedly 
given the absence of strong or unmistakable warnings. 
Therefore, it can be asserted that other factors such as the political shocks of 
early 1994 had a considerable impact on convincing many foreign investors to begin the 
withdrawal of their funds from the Mexican economy, which ultimately brought about a 
strong downward pressure on the Peso and so caused the crisis. The assassination of 
political leaders and the rise of an armed rebellion in the state of Chiapas led by the 
Zapatista National Liberation Army posed serious challenges to the internal political 
stability of the country (Gilbreth and Otero, 2001 p. 7). In addition, the financial 
vulnerability to external forces that was generated through the economic liberalization 
reforms sponsored by the IMF during the 1980s and 1990s contributed to the deepening 
of the impasse. After the political assassinations of early 1994, the Mexican currency 
devaluated by approximately 10 percent. It can be imagined that a further depreciation of 
the national currency would have alienated the Mexican population even more. Of 
course, the presidential elections coming up in August 1994 did not allow for any further 
loss of political support to the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party. This helps 
understand the decision of the Mexican government not to devaluate. However, in the 
months following the elections, the national reserves continued to drop sharply to a point 
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where it became counterproductive or too onerous to sustain the Peso against the 
withdrawal of funds from Mexico. This situation exposed the Mexican currency to 
speculative attacks. In December 1994, the public announcement of the state of the 
economy and the related devaluation caused major panic among investors, which in the 
end massively and decisively contributed to the emergence of the crisis. Due to the fact 
that the Mexican economy was not insolvent, but only illiquid at the time, it can be 
maintained that a softer landing would have been possible by implementing adjustment 
policies at the right time. It appears that the political objectives of the ruling party in the 
following elections constituted a higher priority for the Mexican political leaders (Sachs, 
Tornell, Velasco, Giavazzi and Szeleky, 1996 pp. 40-43). Figure 8 shows the sudden and 
drastic movement of the Peso-US Dollar exchange rate. The Mexican currency lost 
approximately 60 percent of its value within one year, dropping from three to almost 
eight Pesos per one US Dollar. 
 
Figure 8.  Number of Mexican Pesos for 1 US Dollar, 1993-2007 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
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The crisis itself assumed enormous proportions. During 1995, Mexico’s gross 
domestic product shrank by 6.9 percent. The implications for the middle and lower 
classes were severe. Approximately one third of total Mexico’s businesses went 
bankrupt, which caused the Mexican industry to work only at 40 percent of its potential 
output capacity. Unemployment rose dramatically, as around two million workers lost 
their jobs. Consequently, there was a considerable 29 percent drop in basic nutrition in 
the first eighteen months after the devaluation. Even the sound growth of the gross 
domestic product in 1996 driven by the export sector that profited from the Peso 
devaluation was not capable of offsetting the socio-economic damages caused by the 
crisis. This brief set of figures illustrates the graveness of the impact of the crisis on the 
Mexican economy and people (Morris and Passe-Smith, 2001 pp. 134-135).  
By the means of both examples analyzed in this subsection, it has been 
undoubtedly demonstrated that individual countries are vulnerable to the intrinsic 
instability of the highly integrated international financial system established in the past 
decades. In fact, the general pattern that can be identified follows the common line of 
external, unexpected shocks causing the sudden movement of extremely volatile funds, 
which ultimately fostered a crisis situation. 
However, there is a key difference that needs to be underscored and 
emphasized: a weaker economy such as Mexico’s was not able to recover quickly from 
the damages and disruption caused by the withdrawal of international capital and the 
deriving steep currency collapse. On the contrary, in the medium-term the American 
economy managed to respond adequately to the 1987 crash and rapidly regained the path 
of economic expansion. At the same time, nevertheless, a number of long-term oriented 
matters arose, such as the debatable sustainability of American monetary policy and the 
declining role of the US Dollar as a stable and credible international currency, which 
posed even more complicated and deeper reaching questions (Alvarez, 2002 p.263). In 
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this regard, it seems reasonable to think that more vulnerable countries will seek 
mechanisms to protect their economic power more actively than strong ones. 
Of course, there are many more cases that illustrate the prevalence of 
international financial instability. As a matter of fact, eighty to one hundred countries 
have faced a crisis since the mid-1970s (Stiglitz, 1999 pp. 1509-1512). For instance, the 
Russian Ruble crisis of 1998 is also aligned to the same pattern. During the 1990s in 
Russia, the economic and human consequences of the crisis were devastating. The 
industrial production fell by 60 percent, while the GDP dropped by 54 percent (Basu, 
2003 pp. 893-894). Such financial disaster occurred because of an unregulated and 
drastic change from communism to capitalism coupled with a suddenly increased 
exposure to external threats as Russia liberalized and opened up its economy to 
international markets. In fact, empirical studies show that the probability of a financial 
crisis is particularly high in the five years following capital market liberalization (Stiglitz, 
1999 p. 1509). Other cases, such as the collapse of the Turkish Lira, the recent 
Argentinean and Brazilian currency crisis provide additional evidence of the argument 
that such instability is the result of the current form of the globally integrated financial 
system. In this context, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, which will be more 
closely examined in the second part of the thesis, can be regarded as a perfect example of 
the greatly destabilizing influence of financial globalization (Gilpin, 2001 pp. 3-13). The 
liberalizing governments of East Asian nations such as Korea, Thailand and Indonesia 
lifted capital controls and so allowed that highly speculative money poured in from 
investors seeking new opportunities for high returns. When became clear that market 
participants had distorted stock prices beyond their real value, the trend quickly turned to 
a negative bias. As a consequence, investment flows fled faster than they had entered, 
leaving those nations with deflated currencies, high rates of corporate insolvency, and 
worrying socio-economic implications. In the face of these disrupting events, George 
Soros, probably the most influential investment banker and speculator in the world, 
  43 
revealed his fears of the possibility that more vulnerable countries might opt out of the 
capital markets or introduce mechanisms to control capital movements (Alvarez, 2002 
pp. 263-264). 
Such exceptionally high incidence of financial crises can definitely be 
considered as sufficient empirical evidence of the existence of a systemic failure. 
Regardless of the various different forms and shapes that a single crisis may assume, the 
Nobel-prize laureate Stiglitz uses the following metaphor: 
If there is a single accident on a road, one is likely to look for a cause in the 
driver, his car, or the whether. But if there are hundreds of accidents at the same bend of 
the road, then questions need to be raised concerning the construction of the road itself. 
Roads need to be redesigned not for perfect drivers, not for drivers trained to drive on 
race tracks, but for ordinary mortals. If average drivers repeatedly find the curves too 
difficult to navigate, it is time either to reengineer the design of the road or to impose 
regulations on the cars that drive on it (Stiglitz, 1999 p. 1509).  
 
Following the same mindset and adopting a similar parallel, Soros came to 
the conclusion that as at an Indianapolis 500 car race, too much speed could have fatal 
consequences. In order to cope with this situation, Soros recommended the creation of an 
international bank that would bring stability by linking all monetary policies together 
(Alvarez, 2002 pp. 261-262). On the other hand, Stiglitz strongly supported the 
introduction of measures aimed at stabilizing capital flows. By analogizing with another 
metaphor, the author makes the succeeding point: 
Without a dam, the melting of the snows at the top of a mountain may give 
rise to disastrous floods resulting in death and destruction. A well designed dam will 
temper the flow of water, but it will not stop the movement of water from the 
mountaintop to the seaside. However, by stabilizing the flow, the dam serves to reduce 
and perhaps eliminate the deathly and destructive aspects of the torrent (Stiglitz, 1999 p. 
1512).  
 
Besides such self-evident crisis of governance, as has been previously 
outlined, the main problem does not merely reside in the prevalence of financial 
instability taken in and for itself, but more importantly in the fact that weaker countries 
are far more gravely and frequently affected than stronger ones. Stiglitz affirms that in 
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the era of globalization money usually flows from less developed to industrialized 
countries, i.e. from the South to the North (Stiglitz, 2007 interview). From a rational 
point of view, this makes perfect sense, as the opportunities offered in these markets for 
investment in funds, stocks, treasury bonds, and other financial instruments are surely 
more advanced, secure and profitable. For this simple reason, in fact, resources flow from 
poorer to richer regions of the world. Consequently, in addition to the inflow of highly 
volatile, speculative capital, this further undermines the financial stability of weaker 
economies that loose locally originated capital at their disposal, which are diverted to 
other markets, thus increasing their exposure to external forces. 
This underlying crucial reality that economically weaker states are far more 
severely affected by such uncertainties is essential for a better understanding of the 
current and future developments that will shape the governance debate and the 
international financial architecture in the coming years and decades. 
 
 
Power in a Changed Environment 
 
The question of definition of power in the era of globalization is to be dealt 
with in the following section. This phenomenon highlights a number of interconnected 
developments and events that have eventually generated a set of new conditions (Jones, 
1999 p. 357). The environment, in which international relations take place, has changed 
substantially over the last few decades. Undeniably, there has been a proliferation in the 
number of actors participating in the governance and policy-making process. As a 
consequence, this increase of power centers at different levels – domestic, transnational, 
and international – has forced the primary player in world politics, i.e. the state, to 
constantly adapt to the various challenges it is confronted with. Indeed, when managing 
public issues, decision-makers in governments must increasingly take into account the 
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interests and agendas of other influential actors, such as NGOs and MNCs. However, it 
would be wrong to view multiple centers of power as a threat to the authority of the state 
or to assume that the state is in retreat. On the contrary, it has been able to adjust and 
retain a decisive role in governance and policy-making by the means of aggregating 
interests, making policies, and enforcing rules (Wolfish and Smith, 2002 pp. S51-S52). 
Concerning the definition of multiple centers of power, there are two main 
approaches: the first stems from a typical realist tradition and is exclusively concerned 
with states. In contrast with the Cold War era, it suggests the existence of three or more 
powerful countries interacting in the international system. In this context, power is 
described as state capabilities and resources employed to pursue its interests. As Nye 
points out in simple terms, power is traditionally defined as the ability to effect desired 
outcomes, and if necessary, to change the behavior of others to make this happen (Nye, 
2004 pp. 4-10). From this conventional perspective, international politics is characterized 
by the distribution of capabilities among states as the primary political actors. Kenneth 
Waltz goes even further by suggesting that only great powers really matter in the 
international system (Wolfish and Smith, 2002 p. S54). Of course, Waltz’s extreme and 
old-fashioned view is not accepted here for two reasons: firstly, the thesis acknowledges 
the significance of weaker states in the international system; secondly, the existence of 
other actors, such as regional organizations, is considered relevant for better 
comprehending the dynamics of the interactions taking place between strong and 
vulnerable states. 
In this context, Nye’s distinction between hard and soft power is viewed as 
helpful in understanding the different dimensions of power with regard to international 
and transnational politics. According to Nye, the first form of power refers to the 
coercive capabilities of a state to achieve desired outcomes through military and 
economic means. On the contrary, the latter relies on the appeal of one’s ideas, thus it 
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refers to the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion 
(Wolfish and Smith, 2002 p. S54).  
In connection with Nye’s conceptualization, the second approach to multiple 
centers of power adopted here differs from the first, as it explicitly recognizes the 
importance of other, non-state actors, e.g. speculators from the formal and informal 
private sector contributing to financial instability, while states are still seen as the most 
powerful players in the international system. According to the type of actors and their 
peculiar objectives, the sources of power may vary greatly, encompassing tangible as 
well as intangible capabilities. For instance, it is obvious that in the case of speculators a 
large capital accumulation represents the major foundation of their power (Wolfish and 
Smith, 2002 pp. S52-S53). Another example for the emergence of a multicentric world 
can also be found in the continuing rise and growing role of Asia as a third pillar of the 
world economy (Wolfish and Smith, 2002 p. S54). It seems obvious that this approach 
raises the complexity of the analysis considerably. For this reason, it is important to 
reiterate that the focus of the thesis is mainly directed toward states as the primary actors, 
while the others constitute minor, although non-dismissible forces in the international 
environment. 
In addition and in line with the research question and theoretical framework, 
a more classical definition of power will be adopted from a rather moderate realist 
perspective. As previously illustrated, realism offers a quite static view of power, as this 
is defined as the sum of military, economic, technological, diplomatic and other 
capabilities. However, the factor of change related to the distribution of power plays a 
critical role within the outlined research puzzle. For the purpose of the thesis, special 
consideration is given to the economic dimension of power seen in relative, not simply in 
absolute terms among states in the international system (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999 p. 64). 
As Nye argues, economic power has become more essential in a world of economic 
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globalization because of the relative increase in the costliness of force and because 
economic objectives have become more significant (Nye, 2004 pp. 4-10). 
Furthermore, economic power can be regarded as crucial and prior to all 
other sources of power, as it constitutes the basis for the availability of those resources 
needed to achieve predetermined objectives. For instance, foreign policy can only be 
practiced, if there are sufficient financial means to project hard or soft power in 
international affairs. In this context, one could view the collapse of the Soviet Union as 
an economic and financial failure. It can be inferred that economic power lied at the 
foundation of Soviet political and military power in international relations, as it allowed 
financing an aggressive foreign policy. The sudden collapse of this vital aspect of power 
severely affected the remaining constituents of power. 
In sum, both strong and weak states as the principal actors as well as other 
non-state actors interact in a multicentric world, at the heart of which the economic 
dimension of power plays a critical role. 
 
 
International Regimes and Regional Organizations 
 
While introducing the topic of this section, it needs to be underlined that 
since the end of the Second World War the study of regimes has undoubtedly attracted 
the attention of many International Relations scholars. According to the prime objective 
of their research field, i.e. explaining order in world politics, they aimed at finding 
answers that would account for the emergence of rule-based cooperation in the 
international system in the form of international regimes in general and regional 
organizations in specific. In addition, attempts have been made to determine how these 
would affect state behavior as well as to identify the factors that determine their stability 
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996 pp. 177-178). For the purpose of the thesis, it 
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is regarded as crucial to understand the dynamics of the appearance and strengthening of 
regimes, as this will largely contribute to a more complete understanding of the 
prevalence and relevance of regionalism. 
There are three different theories that have tried to shed light on these 
matters: interest-based liberalism, power-based realism, and knowledge-based 
cognitivism (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996 p. 178). Since the theoretical 
framework utilized here stems from a synthesis of the liberalist and realist tradition, the 
latter theory is not considered significant. Before dealing with the two relevant 
approaches, there is a need to clarify the meaning of regimes and institutions in the first 
place. The most widely accepted definition of international regimes is as follows: 
Regimes are implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of 
behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or 
proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making 
and implementing collective choice (Krasner 1983, p. 2).  
 
On the other hand, this definition has been often criticized, because it offers a 
list of various elements that are hard to differentiate conceptually and often overlap in 
real world situations (Young, 1986 p. 106). Krasner’s characterization seems fairly 
complicated and not precise enough to preclude disputes about the proper description of a 
given regime (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997 p. 12). From this perspective and 
focusing more on the explicit quality of agreements among states, the consensus 
definition can be replaced by a more straightforward formulation with lower controversy 
content. This formal approach can be based on the concept of institutions, defined as 
persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behavior, constrain activities and 
shape expectations (Keohane 1993, pp. 26-29). Hence, regimes can be classified as 
institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, which pertain to particular 
set of issues in international relations (Keohane, 1989 p. 4). In contrast to a broader 
behavioral approach, this narrow definition also enables a clear and sharp distinction 
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between the concept of regimes and cooperation. In fact, regimes are examples of 
cooperative behavior, and facilitate cooperation, but this can also take place in the 
absence of established regimes (Haggard and Simmons, 1987, p. 495).  
Regimes can be considered as arising, when states acknowledge such formal 
agreements as having continuing validity. In this sense, there are two noteworthy 
characteristics of regimes with regard to their degree of institutionalism, i.e. the extent to 
which they matter in world politics: effectiveness and resilience. The former aspect is 
concerned with whether regimes are abided by and achieve their proposed objectives. 
The latter feature considers the regimes’ robustness against exogenous challenges 
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996 p. 178).  
Based on these two important traits of regimes, the liberalist and realist 
theories, although they differ in some respects, share their fundamental assumption of 
rationalism that portrays states as self-interested, goal-seeking actors, whose behavior is 
aimed at maximizing their individual utility in an environment of international anarchy 
affecting their interactions (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997 pp. 23-24).  
From the start, interest-based models have been very influential in the 
academic discourse and have come to represent the mainstream approach to international 
regimes. Their main characteristic lies in the emphasis on the role played by regimes in 
helping states realize common interests without completely dismissing the impact of 
power and its distribution. The existence of common interests in one or more issue-areas 
that can be attained only through cooperation is a necessary, but not sufficient condition 
for cooperative behavior. In fact, it is argued that regimes help states overcome the 
Pareto-inefficiencies caused by the so-called Prisoner’s dilemma resulting from a 
situation of non-cooperation or non-compliance with explicitly established rules or 
norms. Thus, they serve to individual states as an effective means to achieve higher joint 
gains in absolute terms. 
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The central difference of power-based realist theories can be identified with 
their hypothesis that states are more directly concerned with the relative distribution of 
power in the international system. In this sense, as the realist state cares about the 
benefits accruing to its competitors, rule-based cooperation is less easily obtained 
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996 pp. 183-185, 196). 
Within the thesis, a synthesis of both the interest-based and power-based 
schools of thought is adopted. In agreement with the double-layered theoretical 
framework of this study, it is argued that each theory constitutes a part of the same puzzle 
reflecting the reality of international relations. At the macro-level, it is assumed that 
powerful states would be more inclined either not to establish or comply with formal 
regimes at all or to follow a power-based approach, within which the resulting power 
distribution would increase their relative power. The North American Free Trade 
Agreement, i.e. NAFTA, is an example of this trend, as the US was willing to enter a 
regional trade agreement with Mexico and Canada in order to change the relative 
distribution of power in their own favor. On the other hand, weaker countries would most 
probably tend to adopt an interest-based stance with regard to their specific regional 
integration, or at the micro-level. At the same time, they are affected by the macro-level 
circumstances, thus they are willing to use the creation of a regional organization as a 
tool to raise their individual leverage in the international system. This tendency is 
exemplified by the cases of the EU and ASEAN, which will be discussed later. 
 It is important to underscore that regimes are distinct from organizations as 
they lack the capacity to act; however, they constitute the foundation for the rise of 
organizations (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996 p. 179). There are three main 
practical arguments that account for the emergence and sharp increase in the number of 
regional agreements: firstly, within regions consisting of highly interdependent states, 
regimes perform the functions of reducing uncertainty and thus transaction costs for their 
members. Secondly, their success in performing these functions raises their value to 
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members and creates a demand for their maintenance. Finally, regional organizations 
containing a group of rather weak, vulnerable and approximately equally powerful 
countries increase the leverage of individual member states in their interactions with third 
parties, and most importantly with regional and global hegemons. In sum, high degrees 
of interdependence and the success of existing international regimes eventually lead to 
their expansion, deepening, and so the formation of regional entities that have the 
capacity to act on the international stage (Keohane 1993, pp. 34-38). 
The new wave of regionalism that has taken place since the mid-1980s has 
had a great significance for the global economy. As Gilpin argues, the reason for the 
steep increase in regional agreements can be regarded as a consequence of the failure of 
the Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-1993) in bringing about a more generalized 
global free-market agreements system, which was primarily caused by Europe’s 
reluctance and inward turn. As a consequence, many nations joined regional trade 
agreements that proliferated in the 1980s and reached the number of almost one hundred 
by the late 1990s. Examples of this trend are the Single European Act, NAFTA, the 
South American regional bloc of Mercosur, ASEAN, and the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS). At the same time, as Gilpin points out, many 
developing countries have started perceiving the advantages of regionalism that would 
promote their economic interests while balancing the regionalization in Europe and North 
America. This tendency can be considered as a response to an economic version of the 
“security dilemma”, in which each regional bloc attempts to strengthen its own position 
in the global economy and protect the interests of its members (Gilpin 2000, pp. 40-45). 
The following figure shows the growing relevance of regionalism from an 
economic perspective. Figure 9 illustrates world merchandise trade and the role of three 
regional groupings: the EU, NAFTA, and ASEAN, which dominated trade in the world 
economy of 1991. In that year, intra-regional trade accounted for 38 percent, while intra-
EU trade alone accounted for 24 percent of all such trade. In contrast, trade between 
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these three main regional organizations is responsible for merely 10 percent of the total. 
This empirical evidence makes a strong case for regionalism against multilateralism as 
one of the most influential trends in the recent era of globalization (Michalak and Gibb, 
1997 pp. 265-266). Both phenomena are recognized as divergent and competing forms of 
international governance in a changed environment. Some analysts reach even further by 
making the following straightforward statement: 
National governments have responded to globalization by weakening their 
commitment to multilateral trade and allied themselves instead into more powerful 
regional blocs. Thus regionalism, not globalization has emerged as the alternative path to 
achieving the goal of managed free trade (Michalak and Gibb, 1997 p. 265).  
 
Figure 9.  World Merchandise Trade 
 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Michalak and Gibb, 1997 p. 267. 
 
At the same time, if the issue is observed from a different perspective, 
regionalism and multilateralism may be considered complementary and non-exclusive 
parts of the same system, in which regional organizations act as trade blocs in order to 
promote multi-regional and thus multilateral trade. An example of such possibility can be 
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provided by the fact that the Mercosur agreement was mainly driven by the interests of 
the EU to deal with another regional player in order to simplify negotiations and extend 
the benefits to all member states (Stacher, 2007 interview).  
In this context, it is definitely significant to note the clear distinction between 
the phenomena of regionalization and regionalism that was proposed by Fishlow and 
Haggard in 1992. According to their view, regionalization refers merely to the regional 
concentration of economic flows. On the contrary, regionalism is defined as a political 
process characterized by economic policy cooperation and coordination among member 
states of regional organizations (Mansfield and Milner, 1999 p. 591). For this reason and 
from the angle of regionalism, intra-regional economic flows are considered critical as 
they ultimately strengthen the internal regional economic power of the member countries 
by reducing their exposure to external threats such as the instability deriving from 
globalization. As showed by table 3, there has been a steady process of increasing the 
level of regional economic interdependence since the 1960s as opposed to the wider trend 
to multilateral trade. This data provides ample empirical grounds to hold the assumption 
that mutual dependence of states within a specific region is higher than otherwise. 
 
Table 3.  Intraregional Export divided by Total Export of Each Region 
 
Source: Mansfield and Milner, 1999 p. 599. 
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Because of the prevalence of a high degree of interdependence within a 
specific region and the fact that non-cooperation could be more detrimental to their 
individual power, weak states adopt an interest-based approach to international regimes 
at a regional level. They realize the importance of regional stability and are willing to 
focus on absolute gains, as non-cooperative behavior would undermine their collection of 
benefits. At the same time, because they are concerned with the dangerous instability 
deriving from the current international financial architecture and the anarchical structure 
of the international system, they are preoccupied with the relative distribution of power 
among actors in the broader context including regional and global hegemons. For this 
reason, vulnerable states concentrate their economic relations exemplified by trade 
statistics within their region also as a protection mechanism against eventual exogenous 
shocks. In addition, they use the structure of a regional organization in order to act on the 
world stage, increase their individual leverage and so face the challenges posed by 
external threats more effectively. 
However, the likelihood that a regional organization can bring benefits for all 
its members increases particularly, when there is no hegemon within the organization 
itself. In this sense, as Joseph Stiglitz argues in a panel discussion on NAFTA in front of 
a crowd of academics and students at Science Po in Paris, Mexico has definitely not 
gained from regional integration with the US, as money has been flowing from Mexico 
to the US in form of increased capital investment and higher imports of American 
products. In fact, even though Mexican exports rose after implementing the trade 
agreement, its imports of US products had an even stronger growth, thus causing a 
worsening of Mexico’s balance of trade with the US economy. As a result, the gap 
between the US and Mexico has widened and the little growth achieved in the first 
decade of NAFTA has been lower than during the 1960s and 1970s (Stiglitz, 2006 
interview). Hence, this form of regionalism is not necessarily favorable for weaker states, 
as Mexico has unmistakably experienced a greater degree of vulnerability. In this sense, 
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it is interesting to note that the Peso crisis occurred only shortly after the NAFTA 
agreement came into effect. 
In sum, it can be inferred that in this case regional integration has been 
beneficial for the regional hegemon and detrimental for the weaker actor. In other words, 
the US gained power both in absolute, but more importantly in relative terms against 
Mexico. For this reason, it is maintained as a central pillar of the hypothesis of the thesis 
that regional integration makes sense for its members only in the absence of a regional 
hegemonic power. This finding will be supported by the evidence from the case studies 
of the EU and ASEAN, as will be shown at a later stage.  
Finally, within this comprehensive overview, the key elements and concepts 
have been examined, which describe the context, within which the research question of 
the thesis has been posed. Anarchy, the rise of globalization and the deriving instability 
constitute the essential feature of the international environment. In relation to these 
developments, power has been defined in clear terms, and special attention has been 
granted to the economic dimension of power. Based on the study of international regimes 
and organizations, regionalism has been analyzed from a theoretical and empirical point 
of view.  
In terms of the dynamics of the behavior of states, the following needs to be 
remembered: regional common interests and interdependence drive regional cooperation, 
which is formalized in regional agreements. At a later stage, these are embedded in the 
creation of regional organizations, which possess the ability to act in the international 
system and take part in interactions with other actors. Given the prevalent instability and 
anarchy in the international environment, it is reasonable for weaker states to engage in 
regional agreements and form regional organization that can allow for a substantial 
increase in their individual leverage against regional and global hegemons. 
In the following chapters, the connection between all the elements presented 
so far will be built around the two case studies of the EU and ASEAN. This will be 
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useful in combining the theoretical framework and concepts presented in the first part of 
the thesis with an empirical case study analysis. The applicability of the theoretical 
framework as well as the significance of the main hypothesis of this study will be more 
clearly demonstrated.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE CASE OF THE EU 
 
This chapter will entail a study of European regionalism, which will facilitate 
a better understanding of the main argument of the thesis. The case of the EU will be 
presented and evaluated by the means of a series of different sources and data. Starting 
from a historical perspective, the analysis will then be directed toward the objectives of 
the EU exemplified by explicit regional agreements and the construction of regional 
institutions with the ability to act. At a further step, economic indicators will shed light 
on the relevance of European economic regionalism as opposed to a multilateral 
approach. Finally, considerations regarding European regionalism in a time of global 
instability will be made. Within this part, the crisis of the EMS of the early 1990s will be 
overviewed as an example of the external threats deriving from the process of 
globalization. Throughout the whole chapter, critical insights into the history, reasons, 
dynamics and future of European regionalism will be provided by a number of interviews 
with high rank European diplomats and knowledgeable scholars from related fields of 
study. 
 
 
History and Causes of European Regionalism 
 
As has been argued in the first part of the thesis, regional integration depends 
on the presence of a certain degree of shared economic, political and other interests, 
before plans for its launch can be drawn. In the period of time directly succeeding the end 
of the Second World War, regionalism as an institutional form of international 
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cooperation had become widely and usually identified with a number of newly developed 
security organizations, such as NATO, SEATO, and the Warsaw Pact (Yalem, 1962 pp. 
460-466). With respect to such widespread opinion of that time, it is maintained that this 
represented a backwards-looking perspective that underestimated the potential for future 
developments of simple agreements into more comprehensive institutions, regimes, and 
eventually organizations. In an influential forward-looking article written in 1962, Yalem 
describes such possibility as follows: 
The process of integration is likely to begin with cooperation in relatively 
narrow spheres and, where such efforts are successful, to spill over into other areas and 
ultimately embrace some form of political union (Yalem, 1962 p. 470). 
 
In the case of European regionalism, it can be easily asserted that this 
description is capable of reflecting the dynamics of the rise of regional integration. In 
fact, it is widely accepted that the experience deriving from cooperation in the military 
realm soon formed a trend toward wider and deeper integration, which first spread into a 
fairly specialized sector of economic production with the formation of the European Coal 
and Steel Community in 1951. This development helped such tendency to reach even 
further to include other areas of economic integration, e.g. creation of a single market 
with a common European currency (Yalem, 1962 p. 470). 
The emergence of regionalism in Europe includes a variety of aspects and 
dimensions that need to be considered. First of all, European leaders realized the need for 
a close cooperation with the aim of ending the frequent and bloody wars between 
neighbors that had such devastating consequences for the economy and people of Europe 
(europa.eu). The solution of the ever-lasting rivalry between Germany and France was a 
key point in solving the uncertainty related to European security (Edwards, 2007 
interview). Based on the Schuman plan, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Luxembourg signed a treaty to run the heavy industries of coal and steel 
under a common management in 1951 (europa.eu). The choice of using the tool of 
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economic integration in sectors that are critical for the construction of an effective 
military machinery is closely related to the recognition by European statesmen of the 
existence of a high interdependence among European countries both in security and 
economic terms. As has been accurately explained by the theory of international regimes 
and by Yalem, the successful cooperation in the narrow sphere of the coal and steel 
industry soon led to its expansion to other areas of economic cooperation. This was 
formalized in the foundation of the European Economic Community through the Treaty 
of Rome signed in 1957 (europa.eu). Such development clearly demonstrated the 
increasing value of regional agreements in Europe and the combination of various issue-
areas forming a relationship of high mutual dependence among states within a certain 
region.   
Secondly, the economic circumstances of European states after the disastrous 
human and socio-economic consequences of the Second World War considerably 
restricted the number of options for shaping the future of the continent.  As can be 
deduced from a close look at the following table, Western Europe experienced a sharp 
decrease in the GDP per capita between 1937 and 1950. It can be argued that such 
economic catastrophe played an important role in the decision of European leaders to 
begin a process of regional integration. As Yalem points out: 
Many Europeans also believe that greater unity will provide compensation 
for the weaknesses of individual European states, and so make it possible for the 
continent to exert more influence on world politics than would otherwise be possible 
(Yalem, 1962 p. 465). 
 
This argument is extremely important for the main hypothesis of the thesis, 
as regionalism can be explained at a macro level as a process of integration among 
vulnerable countries that realize the potential for greater leverage on world affairs by 
uniting their sources of power into one single body. Given the economic situation in the 
aftermath of 1945, European states could be seen as weak compared to the firmly 
established American and Soviet economic and military power. 
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Table 4.  GDP per Caput as Percentage of US GDP per Caput 
 
Source: Toniolo, 1998 p. 256. 
 
In addition to this crucial point, it needs to be underlined that some European 
politicians and intellectuals advocated the idea of a united Europe in the 1920s and 
1930s, a tendency that can even be traced back to the early eighteenth century in the 
writings of Giuseppe Mazzini on “Giovine Italia”, i.e. “Young Europe” (Edwards, 2007 
interview).  However, this represents only part of the story. In fact, directly after the war, 
America exerted a great amount of political and economic pressure in pushing European 
states to form an effective buffer zone against Soviet penetration (Yalem, 1962 p. 465). 
By the means of the Schuman plan and the foundation of the Organization of European 
Economic Cooperation in 1947, which included Germany as a full member, the US 
encouraged Western Europe to look forward to an era of economic cooperation under 
American guidance (Sutcliffe, 1999 p. 187). At the same time, the growth of European 
regionalism was also hastened by European leaders’ acknowledgment that Europe 
needed to avoid permanent dependence on the US, and so to regain its full economic 
potential and independence. This could be achieved by a form of economic union that 
would provide the basis for a political union (Yalem, 1962 p. 465). As Edwards 
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illustrates, there are official documents in the archives of the British government that 
testify the existence of the idea of a “Third Way” or “Third Bloc” as a measure to 
counterbalance American and Soviet influence in Europe (Edwards, 2007 interview). 
Over the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, a series of important developments in 
international politics definitely contributed to strengthening this position. Firstly, the 
Korean crisis of the early 1950s and the consequent UN peacekeeping mission can be 
considered mainly as an example of American involvement in world affairs, since US 
troops constituted the vast majority of the international task force. In this case, the major 
European states kept distance from any direct participation (Edwards, 2007 interview). 
Secondly, the Suez crisis of 1956 can be regarded as an important event that emphasized 
the need for unity in Europe. In fact, the unsuccessful British and French campaign in 
defense of their interests in the Middle East in general and their investment in the Suez 
Canal in specific demonstrated the weakness of individual European states in the 
international system characterized by a newly established distribution of power. The 
British confidence with American support proved wrong and the result was the 
realization of the failure to play a major role on the world stage. This crisis exemplifies 
the growing awareness among European states of the need to unite their tangible and 
intangible sources of power under one singe entity (Edwards, 2007 interview). Thirdly, 
the Vietnam War was sharply criticized by European leaders who strongly disagreed with 
the US administration. The fact that America’s most reliable allies backed off and 
refused any involvement in that specific crisis should have been considered as a warning 
by the US government that it was making a grave mistake. Even the Britain, the 
staunchest US ally, did not support America in that occasion, which signaled the rise of a 
different view on foreign policy among European countries (Edwards, 2007 interview). 
Finally, later in the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, this tendency was confirmed by 
the new German “Ostpolitik” advocated and promoted by the Chancellor Willy Brandt, 
which was aimed at improving relations with East Germany, Poland and the Soviet 
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Union. Although his policy of rapprochement or “Entspannung” was controversial even 
among Europeans, in the end it symbolized a clear rupture between the American and 
European way of dealing with the Cold War (Edwards, 2007 interview). These can be 
considered as the four main reasons that explain the European decision of adopting a 
“Third Way”, through which Europe would regain a central role in world affairs and not 
be squeezed by the US and Soviet power. 
At the same time, as has been previously highlighted, there were other 
motives for Europe to enhance coordination and build a tighter regional integration. 
Despite the already discussed European economic vulnerability after 1945, which 
fostered a tendency toward economic cooperation, the European economy developed at 
remarkably high rates during the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, Germany, France and Italy 
grew respectively at an average rate of 6.8, 5.1 and 5.7 percent for the period of time 
between 1950 and 1964 (Alford, 1988 p. 14). Meanwhile, the massive exploitation of oil 
fields in the Middle East that took place after the War brought about a shift from coal to 
oil as the primary energy source in Europe. As a matter of fact, this resulted in an 
increase in the consumption of foreign oil from 22 percent in 1955 to 60 percent in 1972 
in relation to Europe’s total energy needs. As a consequence, European countries became 
exposed to sudden changes in the price of this key commodity (Sutcliffe, 1999 p. 213). 
This reflection of the rising global interconnectedness and its inherent instability was 
perceived during the 1973-4 oil crisis, which had disruptive effects on the European 
economy (Morewood, 1999 pp. 223-224). Because of this critical event, the issue of 
financial instability was brought with greater force to the forefront of the debate over 
Europe’s future and the alternative measures necessary to offset the related financial 
risks. In this sense, it cannot be seen as only a coincidence that the establishment of the 
EMS and Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) came into effect in 1979 and was enhanced 
in the aftermath of the second wave of oil shocks during the early 1980s. 
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While Europe continued to suffer from stagflation and Euro-sclerosis during 
the 1970s, the American and Japanese economy seemed to be revived and taking over the 
world scene. At the same time, growing competition was also coming from the “tigers” 
of Southeast Asia. Therefore, because of a set of multiple reasons European 
competitiveness in the global economy was clearly falling behind that of its competitors. 
In the end, this difficult situation provided another powerful incentive to the making of a 
wider and deeper regional integration (Gilpin, 2000 p. 197). These efforts represented by 
the complete removal of all barriers to the free movement of capital, goods, services, and 
people within the European Community were incorporated in the Single European Act in 
1986, which constituted the basis for the creation of a single European market and 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) culminated in the Treaty of Maastricht on 
European Union (EU) in 1992 (Gilpin, 2000 p. 197). The bottom line is highlighted by 
the awareness among European leaders over the past few decades that economic power 
needed to be protected, since this provided the foundation for an effective foreign policy 
enabling Europe to play a decisive role on global matters. 
In sum, this important section has touched upon various historical reasons of 
different nature that help explain the rise of European regionalism since 1945. At a micro 
or regional level, it has been possible to show the ever-growing awareness among 
statesmen of the existence of mutual interests and interdependence within Europe as well 
as the increasingly valuable function of successful regional agreements starting from a 
narrow scope and spilling over to other sectors. On the other hand, from a macro level 
perspective, it was demonstrated that external, exogenous events representing a newly 
altered distribution of power among the actors in the international system have largely 
affected the drive toward regionalism of European states that were not able to compete 
with the global hegemons of the US and Soviet Union on an individual basis.  
In the following section, the Treaty of Maastricht and its objectives will be 
more closely examined in order to illustrate the evolution and shift of European 
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regionalism to a more comprehensive political, economic, monetary and security 
organization. 
 
Treaty and Objectives of the EU 
 
According to the official website of the EU, the Treaty of Maastricht 
represents a new stage in European integration, since it opens the way to political 
integration. It creates a union consisting of three pillars: the European Communities, 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the likelihood of a 
German reunification led to a commitment to reinforce the EC’s international position 
(europa.eu). 
A primary objective of a united Europe has been the creation of a European 
monetary and economic union to be reached through three gradual stages. The common 
goal behind this proposition was to constitute a protection mechanism against various 
threats to the financial stability of the European economy. The EMU would bring the 
following benefits for member states: elimination of foreign exchange transactions within 
the single European market reducing transaction costs; reducing the uncertainty of 
exchange rates; price stability against inflation; strengthening of the EU’s bargaining 
power vis-à-vis the US; elimination of the risk of competitive devaluations; reducing the 
threat of currency speculative attacks; acceleration of economic and political integration; 
encouraging corporate restructuring and creation of large European firms able to compete 
against American and Japanese corporations (Gilpin, 2000 pp. 200-205). 
As can be easily inferred by this brief list, many of the beneficial effects 
deriving from a single monetary policy with the institution of a European Central Bank 
(ECB) have a direct or indirect impact on the risks of financial instability caused by the 
process of globalization. For example, it will become much more difficult for speculators 
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to attack the Euro reserves of the ECB, since an incredibly high amount of capital would 
be necessary to undertake such a venture. In addition, the rise of the single currency 
could pose a real threat to the role of the US Dollar in the international markets. These 
aspects will be more closely analyzed at a later stage. 
The second goal is related to the aim of achieving unity in the politically 
sensitive realms of foreign and security policy. In fact, this has proven to be much more 
complicated to attain, as there might be a potential for serious conflicts of interests 
among European powers. However, critical events such as the escalation of violence in 
the former Yugoslavia and NATO’s direct involvement in a conflict on European soil led 
the members of the EU to agree to create a military arm that would have the capability of 
autonomous action, free from the great influence of the US in military and security 
affairs (Gilpin, 2000 pp. 201-202).  
Thus, with regard to the second objective of the Treaty of Maastricht, it can 
be affirmed that external developments, such as American military supremacy and rising 
Russian, Chinese, Japanese and Indian military spending might cause the EU to take 
further steps to strengthen its relative position within this domain of international 
relations. At the same time, nevertheless, it is maintained that economic power lies at the 
heart of the international system and constitutes the foundation for an active and effective 
foreign and security policy. So, it can be argued that the EU will probably focus on the 
economic dimension of power. 
In this brief section, the essential goals of the Treaty on European Union have 
been presented and shortly discussed with respect to the main hypothesis of the thesis. 
However, a closer look at the specifics of economic integration, financial instability and 
future prospects of the EU will be taken in the following three sections. 
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Economic Indicators of European Integration 
 
It is important to evaluate European integration from the point of view of 
economic indicators, since in the first part of the thesis it has been clarified that the 
economic dimension of power is especially significant in the context of globalization and 
its consequent instability. The interesting question that will be answered is whether 
globalization has generated a trend toward concentrating on regional rather than 
multilateral trade. 
This section will begin with a review of the literature concerning European 
economic policy and the challenge posed by European economic regionalism to the 
spread of multilateralism. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the general attitude 
towards liberalization shifted away from strong protectionist policies and became more 
mixed. While the America took the lead in the negotiations for creating a highly 
institutionalized system of tariffs on trade, Europe was preoccupied with its 
reconstruction and the plan of European integration in order to promote inward stability 
and prosperity. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade established in 1947 that 
ushered in the institution of International Trade Organization (ITO) and subsequently in 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) ensured a multilateral approach to trade 
negotiations and enhanced the economic interdependence on a global scale by lowering 
trade barriers (White, 2001 p. 59). While European countries have been active members 
of such organizations, they continued to negotiate preferential regional and bilateral deals 
with former colonies, which brought about the Lomé Agreement in 1975 encompassing a 
large number of states in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). This treaty 
enabled European countries to enjoy a smoother and freer access to trade and markets on 
a multi-regional basis regardless of the WTO rules of multilateral approach against 
preferential agreements. A similar development can be seen in the Barcelona declaration 
of 1995 that formalized preferential trading ties with a considerable number of 
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Mediterranean countries with the goal of the establishment of a free trade zone for 2010 
(Aggarwal and Dupont, 2002 pp. 126-129). 
From such examples, it appears obvious that Europe’s performance in 
promoting multilateral liberalization of trade in the last sixty years can definitely be 
considered mixed. European countries have been key actors in the successful building of 
the WTO and in the enforcement of its attempts to reduce trade barriers and facilitate free 
trade on a global scale; at the same time, nevertheless, Europeans have arranged a 
number of preferential agreements on a regional basis and more importantly, European 
countries have aggressively protected some of their key sectors such as textile and 
agriculture   (Aggarwal and Dupont, 2002 pp. 126-129). In this context, it is useful to 
remember that around 40 percent of the EU budget is spent to subsidize farmers all over 
Europe, but primarily in France. It seems clear that the policy of broad general trade 
liberalization pursued by European countries within the WTO has been counterbalanced 
by its preoccupation that the effects of a deeper reduction of trade barriers might 
negatively affect European industry and agriculture, thus European economic power 
(White, 2001 p. 60). 
When the analysis is directed to the inward effects of European integration, it 
needs to be stated that the European performance seems to be definitely more positive. A 
closer examination of the statistics about the ratio of average merchandise exports and 
imports to GDP during 1970-2000 concerning the three member states Denmark, Ireland 
and the UK, that joined the EEC in 1973, shows a very interesting reality: the biggest 
part of the increases in trade and FDI figures registered in that period of time is intra-EU 
and needs to be considered as an economic effect of creating an integrated European free 
trade zone. In this sense, one could speak more of Europeanization rather than 
globalization in the sense of an intensified economic interdependence within Europe, 
since the source of such trade flows has been more related to EU member states rather 
than non-EU countries (Ruane and Sutherland, 2002 pp. 212-214). 
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The following figure is extremely useful in illustrating the differential growth 
of intra-EU compared to extra-EU trade for the period of time between 1973 and 2003. In 
must be noted that at the beginning of the 1970s, intra-regional trade was only slightly 
higher than external trade. Starting from the mid-1980s and in concomitance with the 
birth of the European single market, a clear shift can be recorded signaling the 
exponential growth of intra-EU trade versus the slower increase of external trade. As the 
time-span used for this analysis encompasses three decades of trade relations, the data 
can be considered a reasonably reliable measure for indicating the relevance of a given 
trend. This figure provides helpful empirical evidence of the process of regionalism, or 
Europeanization in the specific case of the EU. It can be asserted that member states have 
concentrated their economic relationships within Europe due to the increased strength 
and stability of the internal European market compared to the risks of financial instability 
that would arise in the global context. 
 
Figure 10.  Intra-EU versus Extra-EU Trade, 1973-2003 
 
Source: OECD 
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European Regionalism in a Time of Instability 
 
Despite the critical decision of European countries to raise the level and 
importance of intra-EU trade compared to external trade, this merely represents part of 
the interrelationship between regionalism and the problem of financial instability. The 
monetary issue needs to be considered in this instance, since the risk of a contagious 
crisis and negative spillover effects from one country to the other could be estimated high 
before the introduction of the single currency. In fact, it is argued that in order to create a 
more complete and effective protection mechanism against instability, trade 
Europeanization needed a monetary counterpart.  
In this section, the crisis of the European Monetary System (EMS) that struck 
the British Pound and Italian Lira in the early 1990s and caused their subsequent exit of 
the EMS in September 1992 is examined. After five years of exchange rate stability that 
endured from 1987 to 1992, the EMS faced the most severe crisis of its fourteen-year 
history, in which other currencies besides the Pound and the Lira were also more or less 
gravely affected (Eichengreen, Wyplosz, Branson and Dornbusch, 1993 pp. 51-52). 
Figure 11 and 12 illustrate the drastic downward movement of the two most impacted 
currencies, which helps visualize the extent of the crisis. 
The simplest and most popular explanation of this event lies in the view that 
it prevalently took place in those countries that were experiencing a continuing decline in 
their competitiveness. The empirical data sustains this hypothesis for the Italian case, as 
public debt and inflation were high, labor costs were rising, and a declining US Dollar 
was undermining Italian merchandise exports. However, this can only account for part of 
the reasons (Eichengreen, Wyplosz, Branson and Dornbusch, 1993 p. 59). The main 
cause of the crisis can be identified in the complete removal of capital controls that was 
implemented in 1990 as part of the Single European Act for the completion of a single 
internal market by allowing free movement of capital, goods, services, and people within 
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the EU. Undeniably, controls protected central banks’ reserves from speculative attacks 
ranging from taxes on holdings of foreign currency assets to restrictions on the ability of 
banks to lend abroad. Indeed, all controls on intra-EC movements of portfolio capital and 
FDI as well as commodities were eliminated by July 1, 1990. Furthermore, it became 
hardly feasible to restrict the freedom of citizens of one country to open bank accounts in 
other countries, such as Germany that was considered the safest financial haven in 
Europe (Eichengreen, Wyplosz, Branson and Dornbusch, 1993 pp. 57-58).  
As a matter of fact, the only two instruments available to national central 
banks to keep the exchange rate of the national currency within the margins given by the 
ERM were the following: interest rate policies and direct interventions on the foreign 
exchange market. For instance, in a situation, where the French Franc approaches the 
lower margin of its specified Deutsche Mark band, the Banque de France had two 
different options: it could sell foreign currency on the market by the means of its own 
reserves or by borrowing from other sources such as the international capital market and 
other central banks; or it might raise short-term interest rates to prevent the Franc from 
depreciating further (Zurlinden, 1993 p.43). It seems clear that the capability of monetary 
institutions to face speculative currency attacks was greatly reduced by the complete 
removal of all capital controls. 
Given the emergence of disturbing symptoms in Britain's exchange rate 
fluctuations during the first three quarters of 1992, the Bank of England decided to 
engage in massive intervention in support of the Pound, reportedly expending as much as 
US$ 20 billion, or half of its total foreign exchange reserves of that time. Its discount rate 
was also increased; nevertheless, these measures were not sufficient. So, the government 
was not able to sustain the currency anymore and was forced to withdraw the sterling 
from the ERM on September 16, 1992. Italy followed Britain later on the same day, and 
Spain devalued the Peseta by 5 percent (Eichengreen, Wyplosz, Branson and Dornbusch, 
1993 pp. 59-60). 
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Fears of a contagion through spillover effects to other countries and their 
currencies were justified, as it is argued that the French Franc and the Irish Punt came 
under attack as a result of the previous British and Italian crises (Eichengreen, Rose, and 
Wyplosz, 1996 p. 464). Although the transmission mechanism of a currency crisis from 
one country to the other can have multiple channels, one possibility is that a successful 
attack on one exchange rate leads to its real depreciation, which enhances the 
competitiveness of the country’s merchandise products. As a result, this produces a trade 
deficit in the second country of the same region, a gradual decline in the international 
reserves of its central bank, and ultimately an attack on its currency (Eichengreen, Rose, 
and Wyplosz, 1996 p. 468). 
 
Figure 11. US Dollar to British Pound Exchange Rate, 03.1990-03.1994 
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Source: Bank of England 
 
By the means of figure 11 and 12, the rapid substantial downward movement 
of the British Pound and the Italian Lira in 1992 becomes easily observable. 
  73 
Figure 12.  Number of Italian Liras for 1 US Dollar, 1970-2003 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
 
As a response to such fears of negative consequences on the EMS, the 
objective of the Treaty of Maastricht to create a single currency through the three-stage 
timetable required to achieve the EMU was not set aside. On the contrary, member 
countries realized the need for speeding up the process of monetary integration in order 
to avert the correlated risks of the emergence of a similar crisis on a bigger scale. It can 
be stated that European leaders developed the awareness of difficulties and possible 
bumps in the process of integration. At the same time, they were conscious of the many 
benefits accruing from it. Due to the dangerous example of financial instability of 1992, 
it does not surprise that the primary goal of the EU in terms of monetary policy is 
stability. The mandate of the ECB clearly states that this constitutes its primary objective 
(Ryan, 2007 interview).  
In this context, the EU is to be considered as an exceptional and 
unprecedented kind of entity in the history of formal institutions. Member states have 
created one common supranational monetary policy represented by the independent 
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mandate of the ECB, but at the same time they have kept national based fiscal policies 
within the limits imposed by the Maastricht treaty. 
The monetary aspect is certainly one of the most important components of 
the process of European economic integration and it possesses the potential to make 
major contributions to it. Through the adoption of a single currency, many European 
countries have given the best answer possible to currency risks in regional investment 
decisions by completely removing them. The choice was strategic, as it further 
encouraged economic integration by elimination exchange rate risks within the Euro zone 
and lowering the risks of currency crisis. This can be regarded as one of the main reasons 
for the higher growth of intra-EU compared to extra-EU trade underscored in figure 10. 
As a result, they have achieved more stability and predictability important to the 
European business community.  
 
 
Prospects of European Regionalism 
 
In this section both internal and external potential problems and challenges 
will be discussed, which the EU might face in the future on its impervious way to 
become a global player. In this realm, the focus will be shifted to the recently renewed 
tendency of some EU member states towards a more protectionist posture with some 
nationalist nuance and on the affordability of the European welfare system in a time of 
global competition, in which the comparative advantage of production costs is definitely 
a key factor in attracting international investors. At the same time, attention will be given 
to important global economic developments such as the rise of the Euro as an 
international currency. 
Adam Smith, the father of liberalism, represented the opinion that foreign 
trade is advantageous and desirable, when it becomes established naturally as a 
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consequence of the economic development of a country. The most important advantages 
of trade, in his view, are the access to foreign markets, where surplus products can be 
sold, and the chance of acquiring certain goods for lower prices because of comparative 
production costs advantage of one country towards the other. The British philosopher did 
not promote free trade as the final goal without any reservations; on the contrary, he was 
aware of the risks of labor dislocation and massive unemployment that would result from 
a hazardous and over-hurried market opening policy. In this sense, Adam Smith 
acknowledged some validity to protectionist measures, when the industry is regarded as 
crucial to national security and defense and in the case that a tariff on a foreign product 
would simply signify a reaction to an equal tax on a domestic product (Rima, 2001 pp. 
109-112).  
Based on Adam Smith’s moderately permissive attitude, some protectionist 
policies can be pursued, either in the case of a country’s defense or as a retaliatory 
decision to counterbalance foreign tariffs on domestic products destined for foreign 
markets. This explains why anti-dumping protection against unfair trade practices is 
widely accepted within the framework of the GATT. Of course, there have been a 
number of studies trying to assess the impact of liberal and protectionist policies on the 
economy. For instance, a study realized in the late 1990s shows that the total cost of EU 
protection can reach a level of around 7 percent of its GDP, which is by itself an 
impressive and convincing argument for economic liberalization (Molle, 2001 pp. 434-
438). An example of this tendency is provided by the EU discrimination against Japanese 
goods (Brewin, 1997 pp. 236-238). However, the issue is more complicated, since there 
are political reasons involved in the decision-making process that need to be taken into 
account. As Gilpin notes, Europe continues to be characterized by individual nation-
states and rival nationalities that care mainly about their own economic and political 
interests (Gilpin, 2000 p. 226). Among the reasons are the fear of considerable job loss 
and the unwillingness of some governments to allow other European companies to be 
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involved in a country’s strategic economic realms. The latest disagreement between the 
French and the Italian governments over the intention of the Italian energy company Enel 
to take over the Belgian Suez controlled by Gaz de France delivers a useful example of 
such difficulty. In this context, there is a chance that a protectionist economic policy of a 
country, in this case France, might pose obstacles to the higher European project of 
creating one single market and consequently making a deeper political integration 
necessary to cope with issues of a common economic area. In other words, there is an 
explicit need to deal with and solve the problem of rising political and economic 
nationalism within the EU (Edwards, 2007 interview). 
At this point, the attention will be directed toward the question of 
affordability of Europe’s welfare system. It is generally assumed that the European 
model of social markets with lower market openness and a more comprehensive welfare 
system constitutes an intrinsic weakness that could reduce the European competitiveness 
on the global market and in the struggle against the other two models of American stock 
market based capitalism and Japanese oriented developmental capitalism.  
In this regard, it is common opinion that there is a positive correlation 
between the economic performance and the extent of social costs that can be sustained. 
Today’s rapid economic growth of emerging economies that are catching up with 
industrialized countries could threaten living standards in Europe, as more and more 
companies decide to shift their production sites to Asian countries such as China and 
India that offer much lower costs of unskilled labor and reasonable infrastructure. This 
could lead in turn to higher unemployment and increased welfare state costs in terms of 
greater unemployment subsidies. If the phenomenon of the ageing European population 
is then taken into consideration, it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that the welfare 
system might become unaffordable (Atkinson, 2002 pp. 255-256). European states will 
have to take measures in order to cope with such challenges that lie ahead in the near 
future: they will need to cut costly subsidies and ineffective expenditures, make the state 
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apparatus more efficient as well as put forward good economic policies in order to reduce 
the actual unemployment rate and so the need for social transfers. 
Despite these difficulties, the Euro is challenging the leadership of the US 
Dollar as a reference currency, in the sense that it has become attractive for international 
investors and borrowers, which increases Europe’s potential as an even more important 
and growing global player (Steinherr, 2002 pp. 151-159). This has occurred partially 
because central bankers around the world have viewed the strength of the European 
economic and financial system as an opportunity to spread the risks related to their 
foreign currency reserves among a few currencies without relying exclusively on the US 
Dollar. In 1996, the Dollar accounted for approximately two-thirds of the world’s foreign 
exchange reserves, and around 50 percent of international financial transactions. Its 
displacement by the Euro would have a dramatic economic impact. By one estimate, the 
portfolio switch could be as large as US$ 1 trillion. Some scholars believe that such a 
change would entail a major shift in the international balance of economic and political 
power (Gilpin, 2000 pp. 223-224).  
In addition, Europe surely has the actual means to become a source of 
inspiration for developing countries, although not necessarily due to exclusive European 
merits, but also because the Washington consensus policies for less developed countries 
have largely failed to prove effective and so drawing the attention to Europe as a 
successful story. In the future, it is possible to see some countries in Asia, Africa, Latin 
America and the Middle East seeking for a deeper regional economic and monetary 
cooperation in order to avert the financial and economic risks of globalization (Steinherr, 
2002 pp. 159). The experience of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) provides a good example of Europe’s institutional appeal (Viot, 2007 
interview). As declared on its official website, ECOWAS, which was founded in 1975, 
comprises sixteen nations and its main objective was to achieve economic integration and 
shared development so as to form a unified economic zone in West Africa. Later on, the 
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scope was increased to include socio-political interactions and mutual development in 
related spheres (ecowas.info). The fact that ECOWAS is following the same institutional 
setting of the EU and has even adopted a single currency, i.e. the ECO, indicates the 
attractiveness of the European model for groups of vulnerable states that intend to realize 
common interests and collect absolute gains from regional cooperation, while building a 
protection shield from the threats of global financial instability. 
It has been argued and pointed out that Europe has a real potential to become 
an important global player in the near future. Samuel Huntington pointed out the 
following argument:  
A cohesive Europe would have the population resources, economic strength, 
technology, and actual and potential military strength to be the preeminent power of the 
21st century (cited in Nye, 2004 p. 30).  
 
In fact, the size of the European economy is approximately equal to the 
American, its population and its share of international trade is even larger, so that Europe 
definitely has the economic means and the man-power in order to finance its future 
global role. In this sphere, Europe has already reached a point that has enabled it to 
challenge the US in different occasions such as in trade negotiations within the WTO, 
where Europe enjoys a powerful status equal to that of America (Stacher, 2007 
interview). At the same time Europe offers a widely recognized cultural appeal as a 
source of soft power that could serve to create a more positive environment for the EU’s 
international relations (Nye, 2004 pp. 29-30). Therefore, Europe’s high potential to play 
a crucial global role soon could materialize, although the road towards that success will 
not be very smooth, as the further development of Europe as a single political entity 
seems to be problematic. 
Over the past sixty years after the Second World War Europe has been 
hesitant to assume more responsibilities in the promotion of a global model of reference, 
as it was mainly occupied with the inward economic and political integration, i.e. 
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Europeanization and thus it was not ready to play a significant role in the global arena 
yet. As developing countries are performing well and catching up with the industrialized 
world, this inward attitude of Europe might change because of the likely interest of 
growing regions to increase regional economic and political cooperation. Provided that 
this occurs, Europe might become an exporter of institutional designs, so that 
Europeanization may be the future (Aggarwal and Dupont, 2002 pp. 135-138). 
As Nye points out, the central question is whether Europe will develop 
enough political unity and consistency to act as one entity on a wide range of 
international issues, or whether it will remain a confederation of countries with distinct 
national policies and interests (Nye, 2004 p.30). In this sense, European states will have 
to work together in order to cope effectively with the challenges and the disequilibria 
posed by higher global competition in order to find common grounds for shared 
positions.  
Given the increased consciousness by countries of global competitiveness 
and the high speed of the globalization process, Europe will soon need to update its 
institutional framework to the rapidly changing environment, define precisely its interests 
and so avoid internal competition and conflicts over trade and markets. For European 
countries in order to have a global impact there is definitely only one way to go: a 
stronger Europe. Furthermore, from the point of view of economically and politically 
more vulnerable European countries, it makes sense to integrate into the EU, as there is 
no regional hegemon that would utilize regional regimes and institutions in order to 
change the current distribution of power for its benefit. The EU represents an 
organization that is qualitatively different from NAFTA in this respect. As Cujovic 
points out, there were multiple reasons for Slovenia to join the EU. In addition to obvious 
historical and economic reasons, there was definitely the feeling that smaller states would 
be considered equal to stronger ones. The EU provided a platform, where Slovenia could 
  80 
increase its individual leverage vis-à-vis more powerful players (Cujovic, 2007 
interview). 
In sum, within this chapter, the main hypothesis of the thesis has been 
attested through wide use of a large number of sources, such as historical analysis, 
economic indicators, and evaluation of key agreements and their objectives. The position 
of European regionalism in a time of global instability has been studied with regard to 
political, economic and technological developments. Special attention was dedicated to 
the examination of the EMS crisis as an example of the financial risks of globalization 
and its effects on European regional integration. 
It may be concluded that in the aftermath of 1945 Europe was comprised of 
countries that soon realized their weakness in the international system vis-à-vis the global 
hegemons of the US and Soviet Union. In addition to the macro level concern of 
regaining a significant role in world affairs, which European states decided to achieve by 
the means of uniting their power, European statesmen acknowledged the existence of 
common interests and mutual economic dependence on a regional basis or at a micro 
level. This dimension became even more relevant during the 1980s and 1990s in the 
midst of critical political, economic, and technological developments that forced Europe 
to accelerate the process of integration in order to decrease its exposure to external 
threats deriving from globalization. For this set of reasons, it may be stated that 
throughout the whole chapter the usefulness of the selected double-layered theoretical 
framework has been widely demonstrated. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CASE OF ASEAN 
 
This chapter will include a second case study, i.e. a study of Southeast Asian 
regionalism, which will further contribute to a better understanding of the main 
hypothesis of the thesis. The case of ASEAN will be presented and analyzed by the 
means of a number of different sources and data. Starting from a historical perspective, 
the analysis will then be directed toward the objectives of ASEAN exemplified by 
explicit regional agreements and the formation of respective regional institutions. At a 
further step, economic indicators will shed light on the relevance of Southeast Asian 
economic regionalism as opposed to a multilateral approach. The historical and economic 
perspective of ASEAN is regarded as relevant in order to demonstrate the prevalence and 
increase of interdependence among Southeast Asian nations since its foundation. Finally, 
considerations regarding Southeast Asian regionalism in a time of global instability will 
be provided. Within this part, the Asian financial crisis (AFC) of 1997-1998 will be 
overviewed as an example of the external threats deriving from the process of 
globalization. Throughout the whole chapter, critical insights into the history, reasons, 
dynamics and future of Southeast Asian regionalism will be provided by sessions of 
interviews with a representative of the Embassy of Indonesia to Egypt and 
knowledgeable scholars from related fields of study. 
Prior to a detailed in-depth analysis, it needs to be underlined that special 
attention will be paid to the effects of the economic and financial instability in the form 
of AFC, which is interpreted as a key event correlated to the opening of space for a more 
inclusive, deeper and integrated regional movement. Indeed, it is argued that this 
disrupting event has not doomed the stability of ASEAN. Conversely, it has had the 
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effect of increasing the regional awareness of the centrality of cooperation among 
members in order to deal directly with economic and financial weaknesses shown during 
the crisis. As the foreign minister of Indonesia at the time put it:  
We have now come to realize because of the crisis how interdependent we 
are……we must be able to show the world that we are able to cooperate even more 
closely with each other (Haji and Ghoshal, 1999 pp. 759-762). 
 
In the aftermath of the crisis, regionalism gained a clear momentum in 
Southeast Asia, as measures for knitting members together more closely were taken and 
others such as the idea of a common currency were accurately examined (Haji and 
Ghoshal, 1999 pp. 759-762). 
Furthermore, ASEAN seems to suit perfectly the focus of analysis of the 
thesis, as it is comprised of weaker and more vulnerable states, while no regional or 
global hegemon has entered the organization yet. Thus, it will be possible to analyze the 
dynamics of regionalism in Southeast Asia from the perspective of the conceptual 
framework chosen for the thesis.  
 
 
History and Causes of Southeast Asian Regionalism 
 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN is widely regarded as 
the most successful case of regionalism outside of Europe (Buszynski, 1998 pp. 555-
556). It offers a comparable development to the European case, as both regional 
organizations have survived the old wave and joined the new wave of regionalism, thus 
going through a similar transition from security to economic regionalism. Such shift 
reflects the changed global environment after the end of the Cold War and the advent of 
deep technological progress. These developments brought about a substantial change in 
the priorities for ASEAN, as economic interdependence became to be regarded as the 
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engine for further and deeper integration within the region (Buszynski, 1998 pp. 565-570 
and 575-577). This view is confirmed by Waskito, a representative of the Embassy of 
Indonesia to Egypt, who states that it is true that ASEAN was promoted by the West in 
order to confront the Soviet Union. Over time, however, the core and focus of the 
regional organization has shifted from security to economic matters (Waskito, 2007 
interview). 
Founded on 8 August 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was 
conceived as a regional response to the threat of the spread of communism. Within the 
logic of the Cold War, the cohesion and drive toward more integration was galvanized by 
the rise of a united Vietnam in 1975. As Singapore’s Minister of Information and Arts 
put it:  
Without the Vietnamese threat, it is doubtful that ASEAN would have 
become the regional grouping it is today (Buszynski, 1998 p. 555).  
 
It is clear from such statement that the nature and objectives of ASEAN as an 
organization changed over time. The security challenge facing Southeast Asian countries 
helped them consolidate their diplomatic and political ties, thus laying down the basis for 
further development and functions. Because of the end of the Cold War and the 
simultaneous virtual victory of the Western model of capitalism over communism, the 
international context, in which ASEAN was acting and interacting with other forces, took 
a different shape. With the decline of the Soviet ability to project power in other regions 
of the world, ASEAN underwent a period of self-redefinition. Thanks to the positive 
results achieved in the security realm, members of the organization found it fruitful to 
build on the past experience of close cooperation and extend it to the area of economic 
integration. 
In other words, in the past fifteen years ASEAN has gone through a 
transitional phase and a shift from old to new regionalism. The former, as has been 
previously described, was mainly related to the issues of economics and security 
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interpreted in traditional terms as security among sovereign states as unitary actors. The 
latter view of regionalism is outward-looking, non-exclusive and multidimensional in 
function. In new regionalism, international and transnational overlapping linkages are 
established within the region. In sum, this new form of regionalism responds to the 
demands of state as well as non-state actors such as business groups and non-
governmental organizations, whose needs and interests have expanded beyond the 
borders of the nation-state (Buszynski, 1998 pp. 555-556). Such definition fits well into 
the theoretical framework adopted for this thesis. Indeed, it is argued that countries 
within a specific region experience an interrelation of high mutual dependence that 
makes it beneficial for them to participate in regional coordination of policies at various 
different levels and dimensions. Keohane’s interdependence theory affirming that 
cooperation among states is possible at a micro or regional level in the presence of 
mutual dependence and interests would explain the shift from the old to the new form of 
regionalism.  
In this context, the challenge posed to the question of regional cohesion 
needs to be taken into account. One could argue that economics knows no regional 
loyalties and unilateral decisions of single ASEAN members could thus undermine the 
objective of increasing the level of regional integration and eventually lead to a gradual 
disempowerment of the organization itself (Buszynski, 1998 pp. 556-557). It is in fact 
possible that individual states might look for economic alliances that go beyond the 
framework of ASEAN. However, such move does not automatically imply that the 
project of knitting members together is threatened. Furthermore, the relatively high 
degree of institutionalization of international and transnational relations within the 
regional association would deliver strong disincentives against any decision that could 
jeopardize the benefits deriving from ASEAN. Any state will evaluate a cost and benefit 
analysis of its actions and their consequences on the integrity of ASEAN. Thus, in this 
thesis it is maintained that the presence of mutual interests among members and their 
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durable institutionalization offer solid sufficient grounds for supporting the opinion that 
ASEAN will be able to cope with the challenges originating from the shift toward the 
new form of regionalism. 
 
 
Treaties and Objectives of ASEAN 
 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was established in August 1967 
in Bangkok by the five original members: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
and Thailand. After a series of enlargements in the 1980s and 1990s, it now comprises 
ten countries, among which Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar, Vietnam 
have been added to the founding members. The Bangkok Declaration recites as follows: 
Mindful of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among 
countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the existing 
bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation;  
Desiring to establish a firm foundation for common action to promote 
regional cooperation in South-East Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership and 
thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region;  
Conscious that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals 
of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best attained by fostering 
good understanding, good neighborliness and meaningful cooperation among the 
countries of the region already bound together by ties of history and culture;  
Considering that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary 
responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and 
ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are 
determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or 
manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals 
and aspirations of their peoples (asean.org). 
 
Within this preamble of ASEAN foundation’s declaration, the key elements 
pertaining the main argument and theoretical framework of the thesis can be identified. 
In fact, there is a clear reference to the existence of common interests in the region as a 
reason for a tighter cooperation at the micro level. At the same time, an explicit remark is 
made in relation to the need for economic stability and security from external 
interference. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the term “spirit of equality and 
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partnership” was included, which indicates the awareness of the absence of a regional 
hegemon within the organization. 
The ASEAN Declaration includes the following purposes and aims of the 
association as well as the necessary institutional arrangements:  
§ to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the 
region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership; 
§ to promote regional peace and stability through abiding by mutual respect for 
independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all 
member states (aseansec.org). 
 
The fundamental changes occurring in the world during the 1980s and 1990s 
encouraged ASEAN to make some important adjustments to the scope and scale of 
regional cooperation. Based on the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, signed in Bali, 
Indonesia on 24 February 1976, which provided that member states shall cooperate in the 
field of trade in order to promote development and growth of production and trade, the 
Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme (CEPT) for the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA) was deliberated in Singapore, on January 28, 1992 
(aseansec.org). Such decision definitely represented the beginning of the expansion of 
intra-ASEAN trade rather than adopting a multilateral approach, which is illustrated by 
the following extract from the preamble of the agreement: 
Recalling that the ASEAN Heads of Government, at their Third Summit 
Meeting held in Manila on 13-15 December 1987, declared that Member States shall 
strengthen intra-ASEAN economic cooperation to maximize the realization of the 
region's potential in trade and development; 
Convinced that preferential trading arrangements among ASEAN Member 
States will act as a stimulus to the strengthening of national and ASEAN Economic 
resilience, and the development of the national economies of Member States by 
expanding investment and production opportunities, trade, and foreign exchange 
earnings;  
Determined to further cooperate in the economic growth of the region by 
accelerating the liberalization of intra-ASEAN trade and investment with the objective of 
creating the ASEAN Free Trade Area using the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT) Scheme (asean.org). 
 
As a result of extraordinary political, economic, and technological events 
shaking the very foundation of the international system, ASEAN leaders realized the 
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need for further integration and strengthening of intra-ASEAN trade relations. This 
clearly reflects the objective outlined in the Declaration of 1967 asserting that ASEAN 
should serve as a protection from external threats to internal stability. As the focus 
shifted from narrow security to economic matters, the formation of the AFTA can be 
explained as a shield mechanism linked to economic instability and external interference. 
The agenda of the ASEAN Vision 2020, which was adopted by the members 
in 1997, on the 30th anniversary of the foundation of ASEAN, confirms the establishment 
of a shared idea for the organization’s position and role in the international system. It is 
described as a concert of Southeast Asian nations living in peace, stability and prosperity 
in a joint partnership for dynamic development (aseansec.org).  
Specifically for the purpose of this thesis, it is important to examine the 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord II – or Bali Concord II – signed in Bali, Indonesia on 
October 7, 2003. This agreement includes the formal decision of ASEAN leaders to build 
the structure of the association around three main pillars: a Security Community, an 
Economic Community, and a Socio-Cultural Community (asean.org). Such architecture 
can be viewed as a close reminder of the European Union and its institutions, which 
served as a model of inspiration. The preamble of the Bali Concord II includes the 
following relevant points: 
Recognizing that sustainable economic development requires a secure 
political environment based on a strong foundation of mutual interests generated by 
economic cooperation and political solidarity; 
Cognizant of the interdependence of the ASEAN economies and the need for 
ASEAN member countries to adopt “Prosper Thy Neighbor” policies in order to ensure 
the long-term vibrancy and prosperity of the ASEAN region (asean.org).   
 
It seems apparent that the awareness of the existence of mutual interests and 
a strong economic interdependence among on a regional basis has become an essential 
recurring feature of any ASEAN formal document. Furthermore, as the official text of 
ASEAN Vision 2020 asserts, the Economic Community should be considered as the end-
goal of economic integration creating a single market and production base with a free 
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flow of goods, services and investment. Its primary goal is to promote an economically 
stable and prosperous region generating opportunities for business complementation and 
enhancing ASEAN’s competitiveness in the global economy. According to Waskito, the 
Economic Community is considered a crucial step toward a deeper integration that might 
include the formation of a single currency sometime in the future. Furthermore, he 
affirms that one of its primary goals is to tackle the question of how to increase intra-
ASEAN trade. However, there are some difficulties on the road, as many countries have 
the same commodities: for example, both Indonesia and Malaysia focus on agriculture 
and mining. In this case, ASEAN serves as a platform for exchanging opinions about the 
strategy to be adopted and for coordinating policies among member states (Waskito, 
2007 interview). This section has been extremely valuable in outlining the importance of 
economic interdependence and the widely spread perception among ASEAN statesmen 
of the prevalence of common interests at a regional level. 
 
 
Economic Indicators of Southeast Asian Integration 
 
The ASEAN region has a population of approximately 500 million, a 
combined gross domestic product of US$ 700 billion, and a total trade of roughly US$ 
850 billion (aseansec.org). In this section, economic indicators will be presented and 
evaluated as to their explanatory content with regard to regional economic integration 
among members. 
It can be noticed that the economic cooperation being promoted in the 
ASEAN Vision 2020 is comprehensive, i.e. encompassing businesses as diverse as air 
travel, agro-based products, automotives, e-commerce, electronics, fisheries, healthcare 
and others. The strengthening of the institutional mechanism of ASEAN can be viewed 
as a critical aspect of the self-redefinition process of the association. This has been 
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partially achieved by the means of the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). 
Launched in 1992, this institution was designed to improve the region’s competitive 
advantage as a single production unit via the Agreement on the Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff (CEPT), i.e. the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers on intra-
regional trade. Indeed, at the beginning of 2005, tariffs had been completely abolished on 
60 percent of the products in the CEPT Inclusion List, while 99 percent showed tariffs of 
no more than 5 percent. The current average tariff on goods traded under such 
mechanism is about 3.8 percent. ASEAN leaders have reached a consensus on removing 
all import duties by 2010 for the founding nations and by 2015 for the new members 
(aseansec.org). 
The creation of AFTA has had remarkable impacts on the level of economic 
interconnectedness among members. It increased efficiency in production and long-term 
competitiveness of businesses. More importantly, as a direct result of the creation of 
AFTA, trade among ASEAN countries has more than doubled from US$ 44.2 billion in 
1993 to US$ 95.2 billion in 2000. In the same year, intra-regional exports accounted for 
almost 23.3 percent of total ASEAN exports. Before the financial crisis of 1997-1998, 
intra-regional trade had been increasing by 29.6 percent. As illustrated in figure 13, this 
was substantially higher than the growth rate of extra-ASEAN exports, which rose by 
18.8 percent during the same period (aseansec.org). 
These economic indicators are highly valuable for understanding the crucial 
role ASEAN has played in fostering regional economic integration since 1992. The 
realization of AFTA can be viewed as an important step toward building a cohesive 
regional bloc that will be able to receive consideration from economically more powerful 
industrialized countries and members of the G8. It goes without saying that in the 
absence of such institution it would be extremely difficult for single countries such as 
Thailand or Malaysia or others to raise demands and shape the economic architecture of 
the global economy in their favor. 
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Figure 13.  Intra-ASEAN versus Extra-ASEAN Exports, 1993-2000 
 
Source: ASEAN 
 
Figure 13 and the available empirical data indicate a relative increase in the 
weight of intra-ASEA trade, although external trade still constitutes the largest part of the 
total amount of exports. As Waskito points out, the process of economic regionalism or 
regionalization represents the conscious decision of ASEAN leaders to reduce the 
exposure to external forces and possible threats (Waskito, 2007 interview). This also 
reflects the assumed centrality of economic power in the international system. 
 
 
The East Asian Financial Crisis and Regionalism 
 
In this crucial section of the chapter, the financial crisis that occurred in the 
late 1990s in East Asia will be presented. An analysis will be provided with regard to 
causes of the AFC and its dynamics. In this context, economic data and financial graphs 
will be made accessible in order to simplify the understanding of the magnitude of the 
AFC. Furthermore, its implication and impact on ASEAN will be more closely studied, 
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as according to the main hypothesis of the thesis it is argued that financial instability is 
connected to the fact that weaker states seek protection mechanisms in order to avert the 
risks of globalization in the form of a tighter regional economic cooperation. In following 
subsection of the chapter, the prospects, possible future developments, risks and 
opportunities for Southeast Asian regionalism will be evaluated. Finally, a brief 
comparison of the main characteristics of European and Southeast Asian regionalism will 
be drawn and partial conclusions regarding the main argument of the thesis will be put 
forward. 
 
 
The Causes and Dynamics of the Crisis 
 
There are a number of good reasons for investigating into the causes and 
looking at the dynamics of the AFC: firstly, it is the sharpest financial crisis to strike the 
developing world since the 1982 debt crisis. Secondly, it is the one of the least 
anticipated crises in a long time. In fact, in the immediate pre-crisis period, the five most 
severely hit economies, i.e. Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, and the 
Philippines, had low inflation rates, budgets in surplus and declining government foreign 
debt. Thirdly, it is the third-largest economic collapse in the twentieth century after the 
1929 crash and the 1973 first oil shock. Finally, it follows the same pattern of financial 
crises that arose after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1972 and the 
adoption of financial liberalization measures throughout the world during the 1980s and 
1990s. As has already been shown, this brought about a skyrocketing effect on the 
amount of daily transactions at the main international stock markets increasing from US$ 
900 million in 1992 to US$ 1.3 billion in 1995. Since much of this money is speculative, 
it can move rapidly with sometimes unanticipated consequences (Dittmer, 2000 pp. 32-
33). 
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There has been a lively debate over the real causes of the crisis. Of course, 
there is no single reason for the occurrence of such massive financial disruption. On the 
contrary, there are a set of motives that can be held responsible. The first symptoms of 
disturbances in East Asian economies were the failures of certain large South Korean 
conglomerates causing the spread of uncertainty in the markets. In the meantime, in 
Thailand, Samprasong Land, a large finance company missed its February deadline for 
payment of its foreign debt, which in the end caused its collapse. Following this event, 
Finance One, the biggest finance firm of Thailand at that time went bankrupt. At this 
point, foreign investors started withdrawing their money from the country and caused a 
downward movement of the Thai currency, the Baht, which the central bank could not 
sustain for a prolonged time-span. As the foreign reserves shrank, the Thai Baht came 
under a speculative attack resulting in its rapid plunge in July 1997 (Dittmer, 2000 pp. 
33-35). 
It is argued that the hypothesis of “Downfall of Asian Exceptionalism” 
endorsed by the IMF, which views financial cronyism and serious weaknesses in the 
Asian economies as the prime causes of the rise of the AFC cannot be fully supported. 
As a matter of fact, this explanation blaming the Asian capitalist model cannot account 
for such regional crisis, because not all countries were equally affected by it. 
Furthermore, lack of transparency in the banking system, as advanced by the IMF, cannot 
be a reliable risk indicator, as currency crises have also occurred in situations of high 
transparency, such as in the Scandinavian economies of the early 1990s (Dittmer, 2000 
pp. 36-37). 
On the contrary, the AFC can be regarded as a demonstration of the dangers 
of financial globalization. Indeed, the proliferation of international funds focusing on 
emerging markets in the US in the 1990s resulted in the availability of increasing 
amounts of short-term investment capital. According to the World Bank, in 1995, East 
Asia received two thirds of total FDI outflows to developing nations, while net capital 
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inflow to the five most afflicted countries had grown at an average rate of 20 to 30 
percent per year during the period of time from 1992 to 1996 (Dittmer, 2000 p. 39). 
Because a considerable portion of this inflow came in the form of highly 
liquid and volatile portfolio investment, it was able to take flight just as swiftly when the 
crash occurred. Between 1997 and mid-1998, there was a net outflow of US$ 16 billion 
accounting for approximately 11 percent of the GDP of the countries involved. In terms 
of the value of listed companies’ shares, the market capitalization of Southeast Asia 
decreased by around 72 percent from US$ 565 billion in January 1997 to US$ 160 billion 
in 1998. As a consequence, the rapid withdrawal of short-term foreign private capital 
made it impossible for central bankers to sustain their currencies, which had then to be 
allowed to float. At the same time, as the Bank of Thailand announced that it would 
allow the Baht to fluctuate, speculators launched an attack that led to a sudden 25 percent 
drop of its value. The high degree of uncertainty and panic soon spread around the region 
and the negative spillover effects developed a real and full contagion that hit most of the 
regional currencies. The most severely hit was the Indonesian Rupiah that lost 83 percent 
of its value against the US Dollar by late January 1998 (Dittmer, 2000 pp. 39-40). 
In sum, as financial globalization has facilitated the transmission of 
information, capital, and other resources across national boundaries, it can be concluded 
that it has greatly contributed to the AFC in the following two respects. First, it made it 
possible for foreign capital to be invested in Asia in higher quantity and speed. By doing 
this, it provided a big portion of the speculative asset bubble. Second, when the bubble 
burst, financial globalization allowed a swift and precipitate withdrawal of that capital.  
The following figures 14-18 and table 5 help visualize the dynamics of the 
crisis and realize the consequences of the abrupt, sudden, and unanticipated shift that 
occurred in 1997 in terms of the currency devaluation and collapse in the value of stock 
market capitalization. The first aspect is an indicator of the effect of taking out capital 
causing a huge wave of selling orders on the foreign exchange market. The second 
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directly shows the impact on the value of East Asian companies listed on stock markets 
as a measure of disinvestment by investors and portfolio funds. It is clear that financial 
market liberalization reforms of the 1980s and 1990s played a key role in amplifying the 
consequences of the removal of capital from Asia. 
 
Figure 14.  Changes in Stock Market Capitalization, July – December 1997 
 
Source: Federation Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs 
 
Figure 15.  Emerging Currencies to the US Dollar, July 1997 – July 1998 
 
Source: Federation Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs 
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Table 5 in specific, provides a useful summary of the empirical data 
concerning the five most severely affected countries during the AFC. It is apparent that 
the effects have been disastrous on these economies; the case of Indonesia is emblematic 
with its approximately 80 percent drop in both currency and capital market value. Figure 
16-18 illustrated the course of selected exchange rates over a time-span of 27 years. 
 
Table 5.  Devaluations and Share Price Collapse, July 1997 – February 1998 
 
Source: Basu, 2003 p. 888 
 
Figure 16.  Number of Thai Bahts for 1 US Dollar, 1980-2007 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
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Figure 17.  Number of Singapore Dollars for 1 US Dollar, 1980-2007 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
 
Figure 18. Number of Malaysian Ringgits for 1US Dollar, 1980-2007 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
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Thus, it can be maintained that there was a set of causes at the root of the 
emergence of the AFC. The effects of unchecked financial liberalization coupled with 
massive short-term external debt of both the private sector and the state made the East 
Asian economies vulnerable to external speculative attacks. Not enough attention was 
paid to limiting the risks of capital volatility and uncontrolled borrowing.  As previously 
outlined, the crisis had a particularly severe impact on all ASEAN founding members in 
real terms exemplified by a declining gross domestic product, a weaker currency, and 
reduced purchasing power. Thus, ASEAN as a whole suffered (Haji and Goshal, 1999 p. 
760). This is best demonstrated by the stunning decrease in private net capital flows to 
economies such as Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines from US$ 
93.8 billion in 1996 to US$ 69.2 billion in 1998. Such sudden decline caused grave 
damages to the socio-economic condition of the ASEAN’s population in the form of 
shrinking per capita income and purchasing power as well rising inflation and 
unemployment leading to a dramatic increase in poverty (Haji and Goshal, 1999 pp. 764-
766).  
 
 
The Implications for Southeast Asian Regionalism 
 
The most evident implication of the AFC has definitely been the internal 
redistribution of power among member states. According to Waskito, the respected 
position of Indonesia within the organization was largely reduced as an effect of the 
crisis, which affected this country more severely than others. Figures 14-15 clearly 
indicate the higher intensity of the AFC regarding Indonesia, which diminished its 
economic power in relative terms to other ASEAN countries (Waskito, 2007 interview). 
Perhaps the single most significant consequence of the AFC has been to 
reconfigure the political economic role of the nation-state in East Asia. In fact, insofar as 
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the AFC was almost from the start a regional crisis – as opposed a national crisis – it 
definitely highlighted the weaknesses of the nation-state in an unprecedented manner. 
As Surin Pitsuwan, Thailand’s foreign minister, affirmed at a conference in 
Singapore in 1999:  
The effects of globalization and the region’s economic and financial crisis 
have not only caused outsiders to doubt our efficacy, but also forced us to rethink our 
role (cited in Haji and Goshal, 1999 p. 759).  
 
Without question, ASEAN suffered considerably from the crisis, as its 
members were facing harsh times. However, instead of becoming irrelevant, the 
association gained momentum and began to be seen as a vital protection mechanism 
against external vulnerability. As the ASEAN Secretary General Severino declared in a 
conference in Singapore in 1999, there were only two alternatives to supporting 
regionalism: the first would be domination by more powerful states, while the second 
would be a return to nationalism in a divided region. He then observed that the region’s 
economic problems encouraged members to cooperate more closely. Ali Alatas, foreign 
minister of Indonesia at the time, declared:  
We have now come to realize because of the crisis how interdependent we 
are, how interconnected our problems are. Now we see that it cannot remain Thailand 
only having a problem, it inevitably would infect us. So our problems are interconnected, 
our interdependence toward one another has grown, and we realize in times of crisis we 
must be able to show the world that we are able to cooperate even more closely with each 
other (Haji and Goshal, 1999 p. 761).  
 
There was a strong realization of the need to be more regional because of the 
nature of economic problems. We cannot operate any more as individual states (Haji and 
Goshal, 1999 pp. 761-762)  
 
Most scholars point out the unique window of opportunity for reform in the 
form of increased regional economic cooperation in a situation, where a large number of 
countries face similar problems within the same region. There are two points that need to 
be underlined in this context. First, although each ASEAN nation possesses its own 
peculiarities and specific constellation of difficulties and differing abilities to handle the 
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situation, the region as a whole was confronted with similar policy recommendations 
ranging from improving transparency in financial transactions, establishment of new 
regulatory frameworks, and increasing intra-regional trade. In fact, the very core 
characteristic of financial globalization makes it nearly impossible for nation-states to 
take effective unilateral actions. Recently, an international panel of experts has urged 
ASEAN countries to adopt concerted fiscal and monetary policies (Eliassen and Borve 
Monsen, 2001 pp. 127-128).  
The second point deals with the effect of AFC on the level of 
institutionalization of regional cooperation. The formation of a regional monitoring 
mechanism would make it easier for member states to be informed and exert pressure in a 
timely fashion in order to cope with eventual threats. The creation of preventive 
measures was at the core of the discussions among the ASEAN finance ministers in 
December 1997, which resulted in the establishment of the so-called Manila Framework, 
by which member countries would undertake mutual surveillance of each others’ 
economies.  
The degree of institutionalization was then further increased, when in 
October 1998 the establishment of another joint monitoring system was announced, 
which would provide early warning of future economic risks in the region. This 
agreement entailed the exchange of information regarding various issues, such as interest 
rates, exchange rates, and capital flows. The advantage of regional institutions is that 
their function might be facilitated by a sense of regional identity against the pervasive 
and penetrative power of the IMF and the West. In this sense, the AFC could be 
considered as a “blessing in disguise”, as it forced Southeast Asian nations to foster 
closer links and deepen regional integration (Eliassen and Borve Monsen, 2001 pp. 128-
129).  
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Prospects of Southeast Asian Regionalism 
 
The higher level of institutionalization and the remarkable boost experienced 
in the aftermath of the AFC might contribute substantially to the further consolidation of 
ASEAN as a political and economic entity in the international system. It is therefore 
possible to expect this regional association to become even more present in negotiations 
over political and economic issues. This tendency is proved by the December 4, 2006 
unanimous decision of the United Nations to grant observer status to ASEAN 
(aseansec.org). Thus, the prospects for a further development of the roles and functions 
fulfilled by ASEAN are positive. However, it is highly debatable whether it will be given 
the necessary space to gradually become a supranational organization. 
Although the future might look bright, the path is not going to be short of 
challenges. There are several threats posed to the nature and integrity of ASEAN that will 
need to be addressed. Firstly, since the shift from old to new regionalism, economic 
integration has become the driving force. As regional cooperation pushes for greater 
openness, this might undermine the specific criteria of regional identity, since additional 
business opportunities may arise from broader agreements and the development of 
external linkages. In this context, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) could 
pose a significant threat to ASEAN, as it is going to be problematic to deal with 
economic coalitions that cut across members (Buszynski, 1998 pp. 565-567).  
Secondly, the involvement in the Southeast Asian region of global and 
regional powers such as the United States of America, Japan, and more importantly 
China will necessarily require an adjustment in the bilateral relations with ASEAN. As is 
best illustrated by the example of China, more powerful actors will attempt to weaken the 
regional association in order to promote their own interests in the region. For instance, 
because of Vietnam's membership in ASEAN, its dispute with China over the South 
China Sea has become a regional issue. However, due to the importance to some 
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countries of their economic ties with China, it will be complicated for ASEAN to reach a 
common stance against the regional power and in support of Vietnam. Hence, the 
influence of powerful states such as China that attempt to play the role of the regional 
hegemon will probably be destabilizing (Buszynski, 1998 pp. 558-560). As Waskito 
points out, these regional hegemons will endeavor to offer economic advantages to single 
ASEAN countries, thus undermining its cohesion in order to gain individual influence 
spheres within the region at the expense of a multilateral approach. An example is 
provided by the evident political struggle that arose between Japan and the US, when 
ASEAN proposed to set up a regional equivalent to the IMF in late 1997, i.e. an Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF). Japan, which at that time was already studying the feasibility of 
a single Asian currency under its guidance, promptly promised to underwrite the fund to 
be initially capitalized at US$ 100 billion. But, both China and the US immediately 
opposed the idea, which was then abandoned (Dittmer, 2000 p. 45). This type of external 
involvement could potentially threaten ASEAN’s unity. However, according to Waskito, 
this also poses a positive challenge to ASEAN by encouraging its further internal 
development. In fact, he asserts, this regional organization helps single Southeast Asian 
nations increase their individual leverage in relations with third parties and hegemons in 
particular. As a matter of fact, until now every ASEAN country shares the view that 
ASEAN represents the most important organization for their future (Waskito, 2007 
interview). 
Despite such challenges, the fact that the economic and security community 
are both integral parts of ASEAN points out that the association is willing to cooperate 
economically with third parties, but that the positive experience of cohesion and mutual 
respect since its foundation offers a considerable incentive for keeping the security 
structure in a globalized world, in which regional powers might still act in a realist 
manner. In this sense, the realist principle of “divide et impera” may be still implemented 
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in various occasions, as it is the relative strength of one country in relation to another that 
matters to potential regional hegemons. 
 
 
Comparison between EU and ASEAN 
 
In this brief section, the patterns of European and Southeast Asian 
regionalism will be compared with regard to a few essential aspects. The focus will be 
merely shifted to those differences that are additional to the ones previously outlined 
throughout both chapters III and IV.  Meanwhile, the key similarities will be summarized 
in the conclusion of the thesis, where an overall evaluation of the case studies and their 
relevance will be provided. 
The first important difference between the EU and ASEAN deals with the 
distinct role that America played in Asia compared to Europe in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. In fact, American hegemonic power in Asia was relatively far 
greater than in Europe due to the weakness of these former European colonies, and US 
policy in Asia did not pursue the principle of multilateralism as it did in Europe. Because 
American diplomacy in the Pacific region has mainly been bilateral and not multilateral, 
this has made it far more complicated for Asian states for develop broad, interconnecting 
and institutionalized regional agreements (Eliassen and Borve Monsen, 2001 p. 125). 
A second difference can be identified with the high political heterogeneity of 
the ASEAN region. While European countries are all democratic polities, there are more 
substantial differences as to the depth of democracy in Southeast Asian nations. This 
obviously may constitute a major barrier to the development of institutional economic 
cooperation. In addition, this heterogeneity is problematic, when it comes to formal 
economic cooperation, as it raises the transaction costs of institution-building (Eliassen 
and Borve Monsen, 2001 p. 126). As Waskito underlines, ASEAN is a rather loose 
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organization compared to the EU (Waskito, 2007 interview). For this reason, many 
authors regard ASEAN more comparable to the EU of the 1970s than to today’s EU. 
A third relevant dissimilarity lies in the considerable economic disparity 
within ASEAN, which represents the single most important obstacle to formal economic 
cooperation. For instance, at the end of the 1990s, there was an enormous divergence in 
per capita income among member states ranging from about US$ 1,086 in Indonesia to 
US$ 20,400 in Brunei (Eliassen and Borve Monsen, 2001 p. 126). 
The final noteworthy point is related to the cultural heterogeneity in the 
Pacific region, which also has the potential to increase transaction costs. In fact, within 
ASEAN there are six main religions – Buddhism, Taoism, Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, 
and Confucianism – while in the EU Christianity can definitely be considered as the 
major religion, as the least for the time being (Eliassen and Borve Monsen, 2001 p. 127). 
In order to complement the analysis provided so far, this short section has 
served to shed light on additional variables that have affected or might influence the 
trend toward regionalism. An overall assessment will be delivered in the conclusion. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
With regard to the future of regionalism there are three possibilities: 
weakening, stabilization, or strengthening. It is argued that basically all three variations 
are possible, but the least probable is definitely a weakening of regional integration, since 
this would have enormous costs of re-adaptation after having spent time and efforts at 
building solid and effective regional institutions. In this sense, a cost and benefit analysis 
would probably prove the choice of abandoning a regional bloc as ineffective and more 
costly. It is argued that institutions become more valued and relevant, as their duration 
increases.  
On the contrary, as has been widely and deeply described within the thesis by 
the means of the case studies of the EU and ASEAN, the historical data on regional 
groupings shows a clear pattern and dynamics toward an enlargement and deepening of 
regional integration. It is maintained that the fact that weaker countries seek tighter 
regional cooperation as opposed to multilateralism is correlated to the destabilizing 
threats deriving from economic and financial globalization. Building on the successful 
stories of the EU and ASEAN that have signified many benefits for their members, the 
trend has already started spreading around the world generating an astonishing 
proliferation of regional agreements. In this context, regional organizations as a platform 
for smaller and more vulnerable states to increase their individual leverage need to be 
considered as full-fledged players interacting with global, regional hegemons in the 
international system. 
With respect to the specific challenges of financial globalization and its 
inherent dangerous legacies, it is possible to experience the rise of regional currencies. 
This would also fit the assumption that economic power has gained great importance in 
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international relations, as every actor in the international system attempts to increase its 
power in relation to its competitors. From a financial point of view, a world of 
international or regional currencies would be more stable and safer for capital mobility. 
Long-term interest rates would be expected to decline and become less volatile, thus 
making it easier for governments to cut budget deficits and promote growth. Moreover, 
this would eliminate currency and maturity mismatches by denominating debts in the 
same currency as a firm’s cash flow. The risk of unfavorable devaluations leading to a 
payment crisis would be removed. It would also enable countries to take out long-term 
loans. Hence, there are many advantages accruing from regional monetary integration. 
As a matter of fact, the current system of over one hundred different currencies is 
unlikely to be stable or compatible with globalization. As emerging economies will 
follow the example of the EU, a scenario of fewer monies will necessarily foster the 
establishment of respective monetary institutions. As the IMF was created in a US 
Dollar-centric world, such system is unlikely to survive in its present form in a world 
dominated by regional currencies (Hausmann, 1999 pp. 76-78). As has been shown by 
the example of the AMF, there is evidence that such change is already occurring.  
The combination of lower incidence of financial crises in emerging 
economies of weaker states and more stability within regional organizations resulting 
from the creation of regional currencies would definitely benefit the global economic 
system as a whole. For this reason, resistance to a regionalized monetary system will be 
abandoned sometime in the future (Dornbusch, 2001 p. 242). 
In sum, the great complexity of the topic of the thesis has been tackled by 
applying a double-layered theoretical framework consisting of complementary parts to 
validate the main argument put forward here. The large amount and variety of data have 
enabled the analysis to raise its relevance and its explanatory strength. 
In the first part of the thesis, its foundations, structure, modus operandi, and 
context have been defined and described by the means of a sufficient set of theoretical 
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references and practical examples. On the other hand, in the second part, the focus of the 
research has been directed to the study of two case studies and future prospects of 
regionalism, while always drawing a connection line between the main argument and 
conceptual framework of the thesis, on one side, and the additional empirical information 
delivered by the case studies on the other. In particular, within chapter III and IV, an in-
depth analysis of the rise of regionalism in Europe and Southeast Asia has been provided, 
which can be seen as representative cases of a general trend of international political 
change. They have been selected because of their high applicability with respect to the 
main purpose of the thesis. In each case, a number of sources have been studied and 
evaluated. These have encompassed a historical perspective on the causes and dynamics 
of regionalism; a closer examination of formal agreements and their objectives; an 
evaluation of economic indicators of regional integration illustrated by related charts; and 
finally, an assessment of the correlation between financial globalization and regionalism 
by the means of the emblematic effects of instability in the form of financial crises. Such 
comprehensive methodology has made it possible to gather sufficient empirical data to 
support the main hypothesis of the thesis.  
Both the EU and ASEAN are to be considered as the most significant 
examples of the shift from the old wave of predominantly security-based regionalism to 
the new wave of mainly economy-oriented regionalism. After a difficult start, the 
respective leaders realized the relevance of common interests and regional 
interdependence.  Both regional organizations have built upon their successful experience 
in the narrow sphere of security matters and have slowly expanded cooperation to other 
issue-areas, which confirms the value of the theory of international regimes adopted here. 
During a period of substantial political, economic, and technological changes 
in the international political economic system in the 1980s and 1990s, both organizations 
made the critical decision to concentrate on regional integration rather than embrace a 
multilateral approach. It has been clearly demonstrated that the potential threats of 
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financial instability originating from the advent of globalization and the higher global 
interconnectedness have been closely related to the deepening of political and economic 
regional integration in both cases of the EU and ASEAN. In this regard, the economic 
dimension of regional cooperation exemplified by intra-regional trade and closer 
economic and financial coordination is to be considered as the most significant aspect of 
power in the era of globalization. The positive, “regionalist” approach of these regional 
organizations to financial crises is a clear demonstration of the primary point of the 
thesis: financial instability as a phenomenon linked to regionalism interpreted as a 
mechanism to avert eventual risks and dangers for the countries’ economic power. 
Within an environment that is characterized by financial instability and is still 
dominated by anarchy at the macro level, states that could not exert a considerable 
amount of influence on world affairs on an individual basis decide to unite their power 
into one single body in order to confront regional and global hegemons and attempt a 
systemic change for their benefit.  
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APPENDIX I 
TARIFF AVERAGES, 1980s-1990s 
 
The following table shows the substantial drop in tariff levels during the last two decades 
of the twentieth century. It indicates the general tendency toward more economic 
openness starting in the 1980s given critical political, economic, and technological 
changes. 
 
Source: Dollar and Kraay, 2004. 
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APPENDIX II 
INWARD FDI STOCK RANKING, 1990-2002 
 
This table consists of a comprehensive list of countries ranked by the amount of FDI 
stock that they receive from abroad. It shows the dominance of the North compared to 
the South.  
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003. 
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APPENDIX III 
OUTWARD FDI STOCK RANKING, 1990-2002 
 
The following table consists of a comprehensive list of countries ranked by the amount of 
FDI stock that they invest abroad. It shows the dominance of the North compared to the 
South in this regard.  
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003. 
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